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When is the final decadence coming? From Sallust and Juvenal to the present (Part 1), TOO. April 5, 2019

The Ancients, that is, our Greco-German-Gallo-Slavo-Illyro-Roman ancestors, were well aware of hereditary causes of decadence, although they attributed to this notion different names. The idea of decadence, let alone its reality, has always been present, although its current denomination came first into the French language by the eighteenth century in the writings of Montesquieu.1 Later on, toward the end of the nineteenth century, the so-called “decadent” poets in France were a favorite and highly praised genre in traditionalist literary circles, labelled today in a somewhat derogatory way as “far-right circles.” Subsequently, these so-called decadent poets and writers started to exert a considerable influence on many right-wing rebels despite their own often unbridled, transracial, alcoholic and narcotized manners, or simply put, despite their decadent lifestyles.2

Although less common than in France, the term “Dekadenz” was also common in the prose of reactionary and revolutionary conservative writers in Germany by the end of the nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth century. Like their counterparts in France, these writers had become terrified over the climate of moral decay and capitalist anomie in the cultural and political life of their country. It should be pointed out, however, that the German word “Dekadenz,” which is of French origin, has a different meaning in the German language, a language which prefers tapping into its own lexical treasure trove and where signifiers often yield different meanings. A good German conceptual equivalent of the French word “décadence” would be a very unique German term “Entartung”, a term translated into French and English by a heavy-handed term “degeneracy,” which, because of its biological connotations, does not always match with the original meaning of the German word “Entartung.”

The German word “Entartung,” whose etymology and meaning were originally politically neutral, refers to a process of “de-naturalization,” a process not exclusively linked to biological degeneration. This unique German word, due to its frequent use during the period of the National Socialist rule in Germany, underwent a negative semantic shift in the wake of World War II and following the Allied anti-German propaganda, to the point that it is no longer in use in the realm of culture and politics in contemporary Germany.3

In ex-Communist Eastern Europe, during the Cold War, the term decadence was almost non-existent. Instead, the communist commissars blasted Western capitalist mores with a revolutionary and all-purpose term that soon became a derogatory buzzword in the communist vernacular: “bourgeois.” In summary, one can conclude that the most avid users of the term “decadence,” as well as its most ardent critics, have been writers classified as right-wingers or authors on the far right.

Three essential questions need to be raised. When does decadence start to manifest itself, what are its origins, and how does it end? A host of premodern and postmodern writers, from JB Bossuet to Emile Cioran, each in his own way and each resorting to his own mode of literary expression, have provided us with apocalyptic accounts of decadence seen as steering us now toward the end-times of the European world.

Despite this, it seems that Europe is still alive and kicking despite a series of decadences it has encountered over its history, starting with the decadence in ancient Rome all the way to serial decadences in modern times. With one big exception. In view of the large-scale racial replacement of European peoples by the masses of non-European peoples, the old European world seems to be now preordained not to a transient decadence, but rather to a terminal decadence.

Before one starts lamenting about the decadences described by our Roman literary ancestors and our contemporary authors, and whichever appellation critics may attribute them, such as “nationalists”, “identitarians, “traditionalists”, “ the alternative right, “or the extreme right” and so on, it is important to single out two modern authors who had first signaled the arrival of the final decadence, although their respective approaches to the content and the causes of decadence were quite opposite. These are the German author Oswald Spengler and his thick two volumes Decline of the West, written at the beginning of the twentieth century, and the French Arthur de Gobineau whose equally massive work, The Inequality of the Human Races, was written sixty years earlier. Both men were writers of prodigious culture, both shared the same apocalyptic vision of the European future, and both can be rightfully called cultural pessimists with a refined sense of the tragic.

For Spengler, decadence is the result of natural biological aging of human populations, aging that befalls each people at a predictable historical moment, resulting in its death. For Gobineau, decadence is caused by the loss of racial consciousness, making a people accept false altruism, forcing it to open up the gates of its city to its former enemies, causing it to embrace members of another race, and spurring it, little by little, to indulge in miscegenation and finally accepting its own death. Similar observations were made by many German scientists in the interwar period. Here, however, one must make a clear distinction between the causes and the consequences of decadence. The tedium vitae (life fatigue), the corruption of morals, debauchery, and avarice, are only the effects of the fading of racial consciousness and not its cause. Racial mixture or miscegenation, terms avoided today by the establishment and its scribes, were designated by Gobineau by the term “degeneration.” Accordingly, racial degeneration operates as to grind down the genetic heritage of all European peoples:

The word degenerate, when applied to a people, means (as it ought to mean) that the people has no longer the same intrinsic value as it had before, because it has no longer the same blood in its veins, continual adulterations having gradually affected the quality of that blood. In other words, though the nation bears the name given by its founders, the name no longer connotes the same race; in fact, the man of a decadent time, the degenerate man properly so called, is a different being, from the racial point of view, from the heroes of the great ages.4

Later on, Gobineau summarizes in a single sentence the main thesis of his entire work: “Above all, and without adding anything else, almost everything that Imperial Rome knew well came out of a Germanic source.”5

What strikes the eye is that sixty years later, that is, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the German Oswald Spengler, hailed now as the best weatherman of decadence, never quotes anywhere in his work Arthur de Gobineau despite his numerous quotations on decadence borrowed from other French authors.

The Enemy Within

One must continue with theoretical remarks on the causes of the decline of racial consciousness, which in turn makes miscegenation look like a new and respectable way of life. However, one needs to look first at the notion of decadence as examined by the Roman writers Sallust and Juvenal within the social context of ancient Rome. Sallust is important in many ways. First, he was the contemporary of the Catiline conspiracy, fomented by Cataline, an ambitious Roman noble who, along with many of his consorts of the decadent Roman nobility, had almost overthrown the Roman Republic and imposed his dictatorship. Sallust was a partisan of Julius Caesar who later became the self-proclaimed dictator of Rome, following the periods of endless civil wars that had impoverished the genetic fund of Roman patricians.

Moreover, Sallust leaves us precious pages describing an important notion of politics which he calls “metus hostilis” or “fear of the enemy”, a notion that had constituted among the Romans during their wars against the Gauls and Carthaginians of the preceding century, the main shield for their racial preservation, their virtue, their virility, as well as a solid awareness of their ancestral lineage. However, after ridding themselves militarily of “metus Punicus” (fear of the Carthaginians) and “metus Gallicus” (fear of the Gauls), after having removed all danger of external invasion, the Romans, in the middle of the second century BC, quickly forgot the unifying power of communal spirit inspired by “metus hostilis”, or the “fear of the Other.” Creeping fashion of miscegenation with a taste for interbreeding with members of non-European tribes resulted in the loss of their collective memory — a first sign of decadence.

Here is a short quote by Sallust from his book Conspiracy of Catiline, Chapter 10.

Those who had found it easy to bear hardship and dangers, anxiety and adversity, found leisure and wealth, desirable under other circumstances, a burden and a curse. Hence the lust for money first, then for power, grew upon them; these were, I may say, the root of all evils. For avarice destroyed honour, integrity, and all other noble qualities; taught in their place insolence, cruelty, to neglect the gods to set a price on everything.6

The fear of the enemy, the fear of the Other, a notion used by Sallust, was much discussed by European historians, political scientists and sociologists in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This notion, launched first by Sallust, can help us grasp the mindset of non-European migrants swarming now in Europe, as well as the minds of White European politicians extending welcoming invitations to migrants. Admittedly, the fear of the Other may become the strengthening factor of racial identity, as can be seen in the proliferation of different White identity groups in Europe today. However, at a given moment, the “metus hostilis,” fear of the Other, runs the risk of morphing into its opposite, namely the “amor hostilis”, or love of the enemy, which in turn destroys the racial and cultural identity of a host nation. Today’s Westerners are already victims of such a new multiracial landscape, a landscape in which they were born and in which they continue to live. Worse, White Europeans, little by little, are visually getting accustomed to such a new racial re-composition of their homelands, even interiorizing it as a natural matter of fact. These are the same people who only a few decades earlier would have considered surreal and morbid any such idea of racial change followed by unbridled altruism, and would have been willing to fight it by all means available.

There is no doubt that the fear of the Other, be it real or artificial fear, tightens the ranks of a nation while fortifying its racial homogeneity and cultural identity. But there is a negative side effect to the fear of the Other which was taking place in imperial Rome and which was well described by Juvenal. The sum total of the love of the enemy (amor hostilis) reached its apex toward the end of the twentieth century in the West. As a result of material opulence and a self-imposed dictatorship of well-being, accompanied by the belief in the end history as conveyed by a set of strange egalitarian dogmas, the Europeans have started, little by little, to mimic customs and habits of their former enemies. Formerly these enemies were Phoenicians, Jews, Berbers, Numidians, Parthians and Maghrebians, considered also hereditary enemies by the Romans. Today, faced with storms of non-European migrants the old White fear of the alien Other manifests itself in the apprenticeship of “self-denial” — rejecting the self. The process of White self-denial, best observed today amidst the European and American political class, is operating as a psychological ersatz for former White racial identity, which, from now on, is either scorned or discarded. By way of example such a new negative identity, put on display daily by Western rulers, takes the shape of imitative doubling down of the mores of Afro-Asian migrants.

We are also witnessing the apprenticeship program of negative identity among many young Whites mimicking diverse non-European cults. Moreover, the reversal of the notion of “metus hostilis” into “amor hostilis” by the current European rulers results in the culture of political penitence. Such national-masochistic mania is especially visible among contemporary German politicians who embark daily on neurotic hugging sessions with Afro-Asian and Muslim nationals against whom their forefathers had waged savage wars of survival from the eighth century in Western Europe until the eighteenth century in Eastern Europe. The present obsession with the extra-European Other — whose image is being embellished by the contemporary media and cinema — was already widespread among the decadent Roman patricians in the first century A.D., as described by the satirist Juvenal. In his Third satire, entitled Fleeing Rome (Urbis incommoda), Juvenal depicts the multicultural and multiracial Rome where, for a delicate mind like his, it was no longer possible to survive.

To see the scum of Greece transplanted here,Receiv’d like gods, is what I cannot bear.
Nor Greeks alone, but Syrians here abound,
Obscene Orontes diving under ground,
Conveys his wealth to Tiber’s hungry shores,
And fattens Italy with foreign whores.7

Juvenal also complains about Jewish migrants in his satires, which earned him the accusation of anti-Semitism by some contemporary critics.

Though now the sacred shades and founts are hir’d
By banish’d Jews, who their whole wealth can lay
In a small basket, on a wisp of hay;
Yet such our avarice is, that every tree
Pays for his head; not sleep itself is free:
Nor place, nor persons now are sacred held,
From their own grove the Muses are expell’d.8

Juvenal’s lines are written in dactylic hexameter, which means, basically, a use of rhythmic exchanges between short or long syllables, thus providing each of his satire with a dramatic and theatrical tone that was fashionable among the Ancients, including Homer’s epics. In the Latin hexameter, Dryden, in his translations, inserted the rhymed syllabic meter thus capturing more or less well the disillusioned sarcasm of the original Juvenal. One is tempted to call Juvenal the Louis Ferdinand Céline of antiquity. In his famous Sixth satire, on Women (Mulieres), Juvenal describes the proliferation of Oriental con men who came to Rome from afar and introduced into the ancient Roman mores the fashion of zoophilia and pedophilia and other vices. Juvenal’s language describing sexual perversions imported to Rome by Asian and African newcomers would even be an embarrassment for many Hollywood movie makers today. Here are some of his verses translated into sanitized English given that they were intended for the general public:

Thou may’st be Father to an Æthiop’s Son.
A Boy, who ready gotten to thy hands,
By Law is to Inherit all thy Lands:
One of that hue, that shou’d he cross the way,
His Omen wou’d discolour all the day.
I pass the Foundling by, a Race unknown,
At Doors expos’d, whom Matrons make their own9

The Romans used the word “Aethiopis”, i.e. “Ethiopians” when describing African Blacks.

To be continued.

  1. C.L. Montesquieu, Considerations on the causes of the grandeur and decadence of the Romans ( New York: D. Appleton and Co, 1882). In French, 1734. ↩↩↩

  2. T. Sunic, „Le bon truc; drogue et démocratie“, dans Chroniques des Temps Postmodernes ( Dublin, Paris: éd Avatar, 2014), pp 227-232. In English, „The Right Stuff; Drugs and Democracy“, in Postmortem Report; Cultural Examinations from Postmodernity ( London: Arktos, 2017), pp. 61-65. ↩↩↩

  3. Cf. T. Sunic, « L’art dans le IIIème Reich », Ecrits de Paris, July-August 2002, nr. 645, Also “Art in the Third Reich: 1933-45”, in Postmortem Report ( London: Artkos, 2017) pp. 95-110. ↩↩↩

  4. Arthur de Gobineau, Essai sur l’inégalité des races humaines, (Paris: Éditions Pierre Belfond, 1967), Livres 1 à 4, pp. 58-59. I am using here the original text in the French language translated into English. ↩↩↩

  5. Ibid, Livres 5 à 6., p. 164. http://ia802900.us.archive.org/27/items/EssaiSurLinegaliteDesRacesHumaines/EssaiSurLinegaliteDesRacesHumaines.pdf ↩↩↩

  6. Salluste, Ouvres de Salluste, Conjuration de Catilina – ( Paris: C.L. F. Pancoucke, 1838), pp 17-18. http://ia802706.us.archive.org/5/items/uvresdesalluste00pancgoog/uvresdesalluste00pancgoog.pdf ↩↩↩

  7. Satires de Juvénal et de Perse, Satire III, translated into French verses by M. J . Lacroix (Paris : Firmin Didot frères Libraries, 1846), p. 47. See a good translation of Juvenal into English by John Dryden (1631-1700). https://rpo.library.utoronto.ca/poems/third-satire-juvenal ↩↩↩

  8. Ibid. p.43 ↩↩↩

  9. Ibid., p.165 (In French); in English www.bartleby.com/204/217.html#note217.48 Also on the website: http://remacle.org/bloodwolf/satire/juvenal/satire3b.htm ↩↩↩

When is the final decadence coming? from Sallust and Juvenal to the present (Part 2) TOO April 7, 2019

Interpretations of any text, on any social subject and at any time, including the interpretation of the verses by the Roman poet Juvenal, are also the mirror image of the dominant political ideas — the dominant zeitgeist. But who will control the interpreter if many Western dissident thinkers today are forced to follow the pedagogical ukases set up by politicians after the end of World War II? In this respect one could cite Juvenal and his famous verse in the Sixth satire: “Quis custodet ipsos custodes.” Who will guard the guardians?, or better yet who will control the architects of today’s newspeak which is raging in the Western universities and in the mass media?

More or less the same principle of intellectual censorship and self-censorship reigns today in the study and research on different races. Given the liberal-communist dogma of progress and the belief that races are solely a social construct and not a biological fact, and in view of the climate of self-censorship running rampant in high education and in the media, it must not come as a surprise that scholars who analyze differences between human races are often accused of using “ethnic stereotypes.”

Now, the term “stereotype” has become yet another buzzword today among scores of speech sanitizers in Europe. The same procedure of lexical hygienics is taking

place when a biologist tries to explain the role of genetic differences in affecting the trait distributions of races. A geneticist, should he venture into the demystification of egalitarian dogmas about race and heredity is certain to be demonized as racist, fascist, xenophobe or a proverbial White supremacist. The newspeak used by the media against the evil-thinking intellectuals has spread by now in all chancelleries and in all European and American universities.

Admittedly, ideas, in this case false ideas, dominate intellectual discourse in the West and not the other way around. In the same vein, the dominant ideas which lie at the System’s foundations, will be a decisive factor in the interpretation of some new genetic discovery, and not the other way around. Recently we saw a witch hunt of the Nobel Prize winner James Watson, a co-discoverer of the structure of DNA. He was attacked in the mainstream media for his allegedly racist remarks made about ten years ago about Africans, stating that “our social policies are based on the fact that their [Black Africans’] intelligence is the same as ours — where all the testing says not really”.1 What Watson said is shared by thousands of biologists and geneticists, but for reasons already mentioned, they remain silent.

Slide by Aaron Panofsky presented at an academic conference: Cheered by the deaths of several important scientists (such as Arthur Jensen, J. Philippe Rushton, James Watson), counting down the time until the the deaths of others (such as Charles Murray), praising the work of a co-ethnic, the academic leftist activist Jonathan Marks

Racial Science

Our distant ancestors possessed a keen sense of their racial heritage which they called genus. There is a mountain of books dealing with the strong awareness of common kinship and common lineage among the Ancients and into the first half of the twentieth century. One cannot cite all of these authors, especially German scholars of the early decades of the twentieth century who wrote scores of books on racial decay of the ancient Romans and Greeks and whose books are ignored not only by the general public but also by mainstream scholars. It should be noted that before World War II and even much later, scholars and historians in Europe and America examined the racial factor in social behavior more often and more freely than is the case today.

Needless to say, the ancient Romans were unaware of the Mendelian laws of heredity as well as the complexities of DNA. However, they knew very well how to distinguish between a barbarian from northern Europe and an African barbarian. Some slaves were highly prized, such as the Germans who even served as bodyguards to Roman emperors and eventually became leaders of the Roman army. On the other hand, slaves from Asia Minor and Africa were frowned upon and were often the subject of jokes and popular derision.

Here is a brief quote from the American historian Tenney Frank, from his book Race Mixture in the Roman Empire which illustrates what the Romans thought of themselves and others. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Frank was often quoted by Latinist scholars and was considered an authority on the ethnic composition of ancient Rome. In his essay, following his research on sepulchral inscriptions made during his stay in Rome, he offers a racial classification of inhabitants in ancient Rome

.… by far the larger portion came from the Orient, especially from Syria and the provinces of Asia Minor, with some from Egypt and Africa (which for racial classification may be taken with the Orient). Some are from Spain and Gaul, but a considerable proportion of these came originally from the East. Very few slaves are recorded from the Alpine and Danube provinces, while Germans rarely appear, except among the imperial bodyguard. Bang remarks that Europeans were of greater service to the empire as soldiers than as servants.2

And further he adds:

But what lay behind and constantly reacted upon all such causes of Rome’s disintegration was, after all, to a considerable extent, the fact that the people who built Rome had given way to a different race.3

The ancient Romans had a clear idea that the peoples who came to Rome from the Orient were different tribes:

The slaves of Asia Minor and the Carian freedmen, Mysians, Phrygians and Cappadocians, namely Orientals, were, compared to the slaves from other provinces, particularly despised in the Roman conscience. The latter ones were famous on the grounds of their wickedness.4

In conclusion, it can be said that a good racial consciousness does not only mean a good knowledge of racial theories, or even worse, proffering insults against other races. Having a good racial consciousness means first of all having a solid memory of common lineage and a good memory of one’s kindred and common destiny. This has been the case with European tribes and European peoples since time immemorial. Once a nation’s heritage, including its heredity, is forgotten or compromised, society begins to fall apart as was observed in Rome and as we can see every day in Europe now. Roger Pearson, a prominent sociobiologist, in his study of decadence in ancient Rome, remarks that “the early Romans similarly held lineage in great respect and enforced a system of connubium, whereby freeborn Romans could only marry into certain approved stocks.”5 No need to repeat how the duty of connubium in Rome should be practiced by young European would-be couples today. However, suggestions of this sort go beyond the scope of this article. Having been subjected for decades to Hollywood propaganda, it has become fashionable among young Whites to bond with partners of different races. Very rarely do sentiments of reciprocal love occur; rather we see a trend toward idealizing miscegenation originating from the reversal of traditional in-group values.

It is useless to criticize the effects of miscegenation without mentioning its causes. In the same vein, one must first decipher the causes of non-European immigration before criticizing its deleterious effects. Admittedly, as has been already pointed out, the main cause of decadence lies in neglect of racial consciousness. But racial consciousness had already been weakened or suppressed by the early Christian teachings on equality whose secular forms are now surfacing in the ideology of anti-fascism and the rise of various egalitarian and globalist sects preaching the end of history within a great multiracial and transsexual embrace. Criticizing Christian dogmas and their modern ecumenical visions of non-White migrants is quite an explosive issue among our traditionalist Christian friends and especially among our friends in America, a country where the Bible still plays a very important role. However, if we do not tackle the negative causes of Christian egalitarianism we might just as well be going in circles with our hollow remarks on the liberal or the communist evil. As much as it is very commendable to criticize “antifas” or the big capital of globalist corporations and their financial maneuvering, it must not be forgotten that the loudest advocate today of non-European migrations is the Catholic Church and its German and American cardinals. Roger Pearson writes:

Spreading first among the slaves and lowest classes of the Roman empire, Christianity came to teach that all men were equal in the eyes of a universal Creator God, an idea that was totally alien to older European thought which had recognized a hierarchy of competence among men and even among the gods. … Since all men and women were the “children of God,” all were equal before their Divine Maker!6

If we were to trace and then combat the roots of decadence and its bad effects that manifest themselves in multiculturalism and miscegenation, we must first look critically at the early Christian teachings on equality. What we are now observing in the West submerged by non-European populations is the final and logical result of the ​​egalitarian and globalist mystique preached by Christianity over the last two thousand years.

  1. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/james-watson-racism-sexism-dna-race-intelligence-genetics-double-helix-a8725556.html ↩↩↩↩

  2. Tenney Frank, „Race Mixture in the Roman Empire“, The American Historical Review, Vol. XXI, Nr. 4, July 1916, p. 701. ↩↩↩↩

  3. Ibid. 705 ↩↩↩↩

  4. Heikki Solin, “Zur Herkunft der römischen Sklaven” www.academia.edu/10087127/Zur_Herkunft_der_r%C3%B6mischen_Sklaven ↩↩↩↩

  5. Roger Pearson, « Heredity in the History of Western Culture, » The Mankind Quarterly, XXXV. Nr. 3. printemps 1995, p. 233. ↩↩↩↩

  6. Ibid p. 234. ↩↩↩↩

What to read? (Part 5) A White Character Survey: Envy in Politics and Literature (Part 1)

Among Europeans, since antiquity, envy and jealousy have been main driving forces in the political process, resulting in a treasure trove of different literary genres. All European languages make a fine distinction between envy and jealousy, although both notions often overlap. The Germans have an additional nuanced word for this character aberration, i.e. “Schadenfreude,” a compound noun literally meaning when someone rejoices over someone else’s bad luck.

Today, the notion of schadenfreude may apply to Whites who savor the professional failure of their racial next-of-kin. Schadenfreude has been for centuries a dominant feature among White intellectuals, rulers and politicians, although for obvious reasons, none of them has ever been eager to publicly admit this character defect. Outbursts of poorly concealed envy can be observed today among a number of White nationalists, White self-appointed leaders, and White spokesmen, faking sympathy and compassion for their better-skilled rivals on the one hand, yet gleefully gloating in private over their next-of-kin’s minor faux pas on the other. Over the last half a century envy and jealousy have been the prime reason for the lack of unity among so-called White movements and parties in Europe and the USA.

The most glaring case study of the destructive envy can be observed today among individuals critical of celebrity billionaire Donald Trump and his beautiful wife and intelligent, attractive children, who in turn are now being assaulted by a lethal barrage of pathological envy and jealousy, not only by predictable envy-ridden non-White detractors, but also by more intelligent, jealous White rivals. The late French-Romanian philosopher of gloom and doom, Emile Cioran, a household name among Alt-Right and New-Right intellectuals and sympathizers, describes political rivalry as just another shorthand for the envy contest.

More or less all humans are envious; politicians are absolutely envious. One becomes envious insofar as one can’t stand anybody next to himself or above himself. Engaging oneself in a project, a project of any kind, even the most trivial one, means sacrificing oneself to envy — the supreme prerogative of all humans (French original, p. 1009).

Beware of White Friends

Undoubtedly the self-perception of Whites differs substantially from the perception of Whites by non-Whites. There is ample empirical evidence showing the lines of cognitive demarcation and IQ difference between different races, thus slowly but surely refuting the modern dogma of racial equality. But what about ingroup rivalry resulting in envy and hostility between two White equals? To make matters worse even the most intelligent, the most cultivated, the least biased White man of strong character and of impeccable civic virtues, may become at times a victim of trendy power delusions, which in turn makes him a nuisance to his kind and ruins the community he lives in. Witness the timeless Shakespeare’s character Macbeth, becoming belatedly aware of the nullity of royal life without progeny, and who had turned from being a virtuous man into a mass killer.

Upon my head they plac’d a fruitless crown, And put a barren sceptre in my grip, Thence to be wrench’d with an unlineal hand [1]

Due to the impossibility of quantifying someone’s character, the subject of character flaw still remains an uncharted field for racial theorists, aka “political anthropologists.” The late German anthropologist Ludwig Clauss, whose works were quite influential in Weimar and later on in National Socialist Germany, dismisses the idea that Whites are endowed with better character than non-Whites. Advocating racial difference should by no means amount to setting up a scale of White character compared to non-Whites, nor attributing White European notions of good vs. evil to non-Europeans. It is precisely the modern millenarians, egalitarians and multiculturalists who use this implicit discriminatory procedure against non-Whites: dismissing the race factor and advocating miscegenation on the one hand, while simultaneously resorting in all fields of life to White man’s standards on the other. Non-Europeans flooding Europe, or for that matter “Black lives matter” movements in America, are only able to gain self-legitimacy because they have been previously turned into subjects of victimization and self-pity by their self-hating White patrons.

To be Nordic, for example, does not mean to be a good man or a noble man. Not every Nordic man embodies Nordic values. A man of the Nordic style can also be a crook or a criminal. A Nordic miscreant differs from a Mediterranean, Alpine, or a Middle Eastern miscreant as clearly as a righteous Nordic man differs in this sense from righteous people of those races.

To single out White miscreants is not difficult. One can always rely on the safe passages of comparative literature with its overcrowded gallery of White saints and White con men. Again and again we see the role of political and religious sentiments, the obsession with one’s self-appointed grandeur, let alone a genetic proclivity to lying or intellectual pilfering, or congenital melancholy, or inborn bent to suicidal cultural nihilism or philosophical pessimism. Or better yet, someone’s inherited tendency for hallucinatory spells about an abstract communistic Brave New World.

These are only a few among numerous character flaws that need closer reconsideration by evolutionary psychologists. Character flaws or strengths, unlike cognitive skills, or IQ, cannot by measured in numbers, nor can they be quantified by equations. In order to partially grasp the deep-hidden character defects among Whites one is obliged to resort to metaphor and literature more than to mathematics. The bloody in-group wars between Whites, starting from the mythical Trojan war, all the way to incessant inter-White bloodletting in Europe, and then to the relatively more recent carnage linked to the inter-White War of Secession in America, followed by the recent gory Spanish civil war, and the latest conflict among ex-Yugoslavia’s peoples — these internecine wars have all proved to be far more savage than all the past wars fought by Whites against non-Whites combined. Genetic proximity and racial kinship amongst Whites are in no way a guarantee for the absence of jealousy, bickering and wars, which, to be sure, in the eyes of non-Whites, are often seen as the main trademark of the Western civilization. Age-long infighting between Whites, be it on a family, local or a global level, must be surely looked at with a great deal of bemusement by incoming masses of non-White migrants.

The Judaic god Yahweh is a jealous god (Exodus 20:5), which he himself openly admits and brags about on several occasions. He is by definition a totalitarian god who tolerates no other gods and by extension must reject any alternative version of truth, as well as all other systems of belief. His chosen people, just like himself, are therefore required to be jealous and vindictive, dismissing any form of critical introspection when residing amidst a host nation — as decreed by Moses in Deuteronomy. Yahweh is a far cry from the down-to-earth gods and goddesses in Homer’s Iliad, who take frequent turns at jealousy, fooling each other, cheating with each other’s spouses or siding up with opposing warring parties — yet never, ever holding lengthy grudges against each other. Achilles spiritual protector was the war goddess Athena; his military rival Hector had the god Apollo as his guardian and guiding spirit.

In ancient Rome and Greece, vanquished tribes were often subjected to terrible physical ordeals, albeit with one notable exception: neither the Greek nor the Roman armies ever thought about imposing their own systems of belief on the vanquished. The gods, myths, lies, verities, or narratives of the vanquished were left intact. With the rise of Christianity, envy, jealousy and self-righteousness, handed down by the Jewish religious ukases in the form of the 10th Commandment, although brandishing envy as a major sin, had brought instead the White character flaws to their deadly paroxysm.

It would be silly to argue that sentiments of envy and jealousy were nonexistent in ancient pagan Rome. Those inborn, creeping, lowlife features of human behavior have always been common to our White ancestors, as seen in countless examples of bloody strife and civil war, stretching from ancient Greece and Rome all the way to the present times. The school of Stoicism, however, with its most illustrious thinker Seneca, tried to set up some character strengthening devices in order to tame the feelings of envy. Blind discriminatory nature, however crucial it is in man’s phylogenesis, can hardly dispense with harsh and disciplined nurture.

Each man, according to his lot in life, is stultified by flattery. We should say to him who flatters us: “You call me a man of sense, but I understand how many of the things which I crave are useless, and how many of the things which I desire will do me harm.

Seneca’s answer to aping sycophants in his entourage is simple: the less we crave for fame the less we shall be envious of our look-alikes. Another heavyweight philosopher of doom and gloom, highly popular among scores of White nationalists and conservative thinkers, Arthur Schopenhauer, writes in his famed Chapter “On the Vanity and Suffering of Life”:

An indirect but certain proof of the fact that men feel themselves unhappy, and consequently are so, is also abundantly afforded by the fearful envy which dwells in us all, and which in all relations of life, on the occasion of any superiority, of whatever kind it may be, is excited, and cannot contain its poison. Because they feel themselves unhappy, men cannot endure the sight of one whom they imagine happy.

Probably Schopenhauer should have titled this chapter of his “the ode to death,” given that throughout the chapter he raves about the “blind will” causing ceaseless envy, only to end up in dismal despair. Neither could he hide his own immense envy against his contemporary rival, the philosopher Friedrich Hegel whose entire philosophy he derisively calls “Hegelei,” and who stole from him much of his craved academic glitz and glory during and after his lifetime. Why him, why not me? — these are timeless haunting questions hovering over all of us.

In the gallery of the envious one stumbles upon the inevitable late medieval poet Dante voyaging in his purgatory kingdom of the blind where shadows of the deceased are obliged to cleanse off their character flaws by having their eyes sewn shut with lead. Dante’s infernal allegories in his epics were a carbon copy of the hellhole of thirteenth-century northern Italy where religious and ideological fervor and serial slaughters between the imperial-minded Ghibellines and the papists Guelfs reigned supreme. A wretched character whom Dante meets during his passage through Purgatory tells him:

My blood was so with envy set on fire, That if I had beheld a man make merry, Thou wouldst have seen me sprinkled o’er with pallor.

Similar feelings of envy resulting in mass killings, once akin to warring Ghibellines and Guelfs in medieval Europe, have gradually morphed into the proverbial hatred between European Left and Right, taking on today their finite form in the clash between the modern pontiffs of Antifascism and Multiculturalism and modern racial nationalists. Dante’s dismal premonitions were to be echoed seven hundred years later by his best disciple, the poet Ezra Pound, whose own apocalyptic Cantos where framed on the model of those of his medieval teacher, presaging his own intellectual and political proscription in the newly established post-World War II world. Pound’s gallery of the envious is manifest in the verses he wrote right on the eve of Europe’s breakdown:

… And then I slept And, waking in the wasted air, Saw and heard thus – He whom I saw seemed like a cavalier, And I heard this: “Watching my people die Does not satisfy even if they broke their word, Even if they deserve to be governed by King Turd. |Roosevelt, Churchill and Eden bastards to a man, Liar, Jew and glutton.. have squeezed the people dry like sheep!

To be continued.

What to read? (Part 6): A White Character Survey; Envy in Literature and Politics (Part 2)

Physical blindness and the verdict of ignorance, meted out to envious politicians in Dante’s epic poem, can often be bliss. Eyelessness can have advantages, as demonstrated by the blind, poor, uneducated, self-effacing, albeit very intelligent seer, Tiresias, who is brought to the court of King Oedipus, only to announce to him his eyeless future of blind destiny (vv 364-377).

For that matter willful ignorance and dismissal of the brainwashing curriculum in the modern educational system in the US and EU can be a sign of a healthy state of mind. What on earth is to be seen in the political process in multicultural America and Europe today? What good can be learned in multiracial colleges in Europe, whose program consists of lessons on White man’s guilt? For centuries, in order to avoid envy-inducing temptations, high-IQ young introspective White European males opted for monastic life. The harmful side of monasticism was that it prevented good genes to be passed on to future offspring, thus leaving the political arena open to an array of genetic and character misfits: the bad, the ugly and the envious.

Lengthy is the list of authors, usually associated with the heritage of cultural conservatism, who have prodded into the roots of envy-driven politicians. Highly envious politicians are usually very cunning individuals, with above average IQ, possessing, in addition, good skills at camouflaging their moral sleaziness with an aura of tearful humanitarian palaver. They also excel at expressions of sympathy for the plight of their future prey.

This brings to mind is the huge literature on so-called Jewish social mimicry, aka “trickster-do-good-Jews” (“Mauscheljuden”), popularized in National Socialist Germany by the works of Theodor Fritsch and Arthur Trebitsch, and scores of other writers.

It would be a serious error, however, to reduce the art of impersonation to Jews only. Envy-ridden White politicians have thrived in abundance in Europe and America, and their best literary embodiment is found in Shakespeare’s Richard III, a supremely intelligent miscreant, who, when left alone with his monologues, takes extreme pleasure in calling himself a supreme villain, all set to eliminate his next of kin.

And therefore, since I cannot prove a lover, To entertain these fair well-spoken days, I am determined to prove a villain. (_Richard I_II, Act 1, Scene 1)

Examples of virtue, passed down by sages and held for centuries as a symbol of moral goodness, are essentially an elegant cover-up for self-deception and fake commiseration. This is how the French seventeenth-century essayist François de La Rochefoucauld sees social reality in his satirical aphorisms about the army of jealous and envious politicians hiding beneath false charity and feigned compassion.

Festival of Fakery

We are false in different ways. There are some men who are false from wishing always to appear what they are not. There are some who have better faith, who are born false, who deceive themselves, and who never see themselves as they really are; to some is given a true understanding and a false taste, others have a false understanding and some correctness in taste; there are some who have not any falsity either in taste or mind. (VI. On Falsehood)

La Rochefoucauld’s influence on future European cultural pessimists was immense. Friedrich Nietzsche’s own aphoristic style and his own acerbic words against the danger of the rising tide of egalitarian ideologies of the later nineteenth century, is closely patterned on La Rochefoucauld’s prose. Outbursts of feigned magnanimity — the hallmark of many French nobles of the seventeenth century — provide a timely example for understanding the similar make-believe humanism of the modern liberal ruling class, including modern American cuckservatives. On the one hand, they love to show off empathy for disfranchised fellow Whites; on the other, they are keen on keeping to themselves in their gated communities.

A critical approach to the pretend humanism of the elites was a popular subject among French authors in the seventeenth century. Traditionally their literary legacy was associated with the intellectual baggage of the so-called anarcho-nationalists and revolutionary conservatives; today, it is linked to the work of the New Right and Alt-Right respectively. Those French classics are important because their description of seventeenth-century elites hiding behind trendy facial mannerisms and grandiose self-righteousness can be projected on the corrupted behavior of contemporary homegrown elites in the US and EU. The unfolding chaos in the West, however, cannot be blamed on the incoming armies of Muslims or any other group of non-European migrants. Those who started the chaos and those who are now stoking it are decadent White elites who keep importing non-European migrants.

It is fairly easy to spot an envious villain if his character deformity is accompanied by physical depravity, as seen in Richard III. A similar envy-ridden character appears in Friedrich Schiller’s drama The Robbers in the person of the wicked, crippled, yet highly intelligent Francis, who endlessly schemes how to destroy his better looking and virtuous brother Charles and his entire family:

Why did I not crawl the first from my mother’s womb? why not the only one? why has she heaped on me this burden of deformity? on me especially? Just as if she had spawned me from her refuse. Why to me in particular this snub of the Laplander? these negro lips? these Hottentot eyes? (Act 1, Scene 1)

The wicked Francis is an epitome of the in-group infighting among Whites. Such infighting has taken diverse forms of political expression over the last few millennia. In the face of ongoing foreign racial and cultural replacement, however, the laudable desire to reestablish White identity does not guarantee at all that Whites will dispense with their mutual envy, treachery and civil wars. Modern sociobiologists still need to examine why civil wars are more brutal than wars against well-demarcated and segregated out-groups. Far more dangerous than outgroups are character defects when they surface under the guise of the same phenotype, same idiom, and same racial entourage, as has been observed countless times in Western political history. In the same vein, many Whites make a major mistake by using insulting terms against African and Middle Eastern migrants storming into Europe, forgetting that the treacherous or self-hating Whites who are bringing them in are the ones to blame.

In the near future one can expect that feelings of mutual envy and hidden resentments will not disappear from transgenderized and miscegenated Europe and America; instead they will only take on alternate forms. Many intelligent remaining Whites will become indispensable leaders in dysfunctional non-White multiracial regimes. They will, however, be confronted with an age-old reality: they will either share their political power and work spaces with lower IQ, less individualistic non-Europeans, or they will face the haunting challenge of enduring the presence of envious, scheming, high-IQ White rivals. In America and in Europe it is a widespread practice in affluent White households to hire non-White handymen or nannies, the implicit assumption being that a non-White will never measure up to the cognitive appetites or excessive ambitions of a White employee. Feigned docility of South Asian and Latino women is often in demand by sexually frustrated White bachelors in Europe and America. Those non-White females, in quest of the improvement of their socio-racial status, know how to hide their envious behavior much better than single White females. White males, mistakenly, see them as no threat — as long as they stay out of White wedlock.

Historically, an implicit social consensus for a racially segregated society has functioned fairly well despite the bad press and academic vilification it has been subjected to over the last 50 years. In hindsight, the segregated American South and the apartheid regime in South Africa were functional and stable societies, where each racial group knew its place. It was the rise of egalitarian ideologies, imported from the West, which prompted non-Whites to start fantasizing that they could henceforth be whatever they wished to be. The tragic results, both for ingroups and outgroups, are visible today.

Under the credible assumption that in the very near future multicultural America and Europe will face major disruptions and face large scale foreign-inspired terrorist incursions, it would be naïve to think that Whites can be militarily defeated. Even a very small number of Whites can put up powerful resistance against a far larger military might of non-Whites. The major problem, however, resides always inside the gate and not outside the gate, as was observed time and again in European history, and as was recently illustrated by Harold Covington’s novels. Germanic Gepids sided in the mid-fifth century with invading Asian Huns, just as a thousand years later Muslim-Turkish incursions into the heart of Europe could not have occurred without the logistical support and diplomatic blessing of Catholic French monarchs. Stalin owed his military success in 1945 to thousands of Marxist intellectuals who had laid already the intellectual ground for the subsequent communist killing fields.

The present times are just a low-level protraction of the ongoing civil war among Whites, pausing briefly in 1945, only to continue today with sporadic unarmed and intellectual clashes between White Antifas and White nationalists. Those who must always be watched with caution, writes the philosopher Emile Cioran, are the alleged best friends of ours:

If our deeds are the fruits of envy we will understand why the political struggle, in its ultimate expression, boils down to calculations and intrigues that are conducive to the elimination of our rivals or enemies…. Do you need a right target? Well, start then by killing off all those who reason according to your categories and according to your prejudices, those who have travelled the same road with you and who inevitably dream how to replace you or shoot you. These are the most dangerous rivals; focus on them only, others can wait. If I were to get hold of power, my first care would be to eliminate all friends of mine. (french original, p. 1009)

Sounds shocking and surprising? Not at all. All of us, at least once in our lifetime, if not millions of times, have prayed to see our congenital rivals perish in a car accident or by having their towns firebombed. The second civil war among Whites, known as WWII, and is present sequel today, testify to that.

Myths and Mendacities: The Ancients and the Moderns (The Occidental Quarterly, vol. 14, no. 4, Winter 2014–2015)

When discussing the myths of ancient Greece one must first define their meaning and locate their historical settings. The word “myth” has a specific meaning when one reads the ancient Greek tragedies or when one studies the theogony or cosmogony of the early Greeks. By contrast, the fashionable expression today such as “political mythology” is often laden with value judgments and derisory interpretations. Thus, a verbal construct such as “the myth of modernity” may be interpreted as an insult by proponents of modern liberalism. To a modern, self-proclaimed supporter of liberal democracy, enamored with his own system-supporting myths of permanent economic progress and the like, phrases, such as “the myth of economic progress” or “the myth of democracy,” may appear as egregious political insults.

For many contemporaries, democracy is not just a doctrine that could be discussed; it is not a “fact” that experience could contradict; it is the truth of faith beyond any dispute.[^1]

Criticizing, therefore, the myth of modern democracy may be often interpreted as a sign of pathological behavior. Given this modern liberal dispensation, how does one dare use such locutions as “the myth of modern democracy,” or “the myth of contemporary historiography,” or “the myth of progress” without being punished?

Ancient European myths, legends and folk tales are viewed by some scholars, including some Christian theologians, as gross re-enactments of European barbarism, superstition, and sexual promiscuity.[^2] However, if a reader or a researcher immerses himself in the symbolism of the European myths, let alone attempts to decipher the allegorical meaning of the diverse creatures in those myths, such as, for instance, the scenes from the Orphic rituals, the hellhole of Tartarus, the carnage in the Iliad or in the _Nibelungenlie_d, or the final divine battle in Ragnarök, then those mythical scenes take on a different, albeit often a self-serving meaning.[^3] After all, in our modern so-called enlightened and freedom-loving liberal societies, citizens are also entangled in a profusion of bizarre infra-political myths, in a myriad of hagiographic tales, especially those dealing with World War II victimhoods, as well as countless trans-political legends which are often enforced under penalty of law. There-fore, understanding ancient and modern European myths and myth-makers, means, first and foremost, reading between the lines and strengthening one’s sense of the metaphor.

In hindsight when one studies the ancient Greek myths with their surreal settings and hyperreal creatures, few will accord them historical veracity or any empirical or scientific value. However, few will reject them as outright fabrications. Why is that? In fact, citizens in Europe and America, both young and old, still enjoy reading the ancient Greek myths because most of them are aware not only of their strong symbolic nature, but also of their didactic message. This is the main reason why those ancient European myths and sagas are still popular. Ancient European myths and legends thrive in timelessness; they are meant to go beyond any historical time frame; they defy any historicity. They are open to anybody’s “historical revisionism” or interpretation. This is why ancient European myths or sagas can never be dogmatic; they never re-quire the intervention of the thought police or a politically correct enforcer in order to make themselves readable or credible.

The prose of Homer or Hesiod is not just a part of the European cultural heritage, but could be interpreted also as a mirror of the pre-Christian European subconscious. In fact, one could describe ancient European myths as primal allegories where every stone, every creature, every god or demigod, let alone each monster, acts as a role model representing a symbol of good or evil.[^4] Whether Hercules historically exist-ed or not is beside the point. He still lives in our memory. When we were young and when we were reading Homer, who among us did not dream about making love to the goddess Aphrodite? Or at least make some furtive passes at Daphne? Apollo, a god with a sense of moderation and beauty was our hero, as was the pesky Titan Prometheus, al-ways trying to surpass himself with his boundless intellectual curiosity. Prometheus unbound is the prime symbol of White man’s irresistible drive toward the unknown and toward the truth irrespective of the name he carries in ancient sagas, modern novels, or political treatises. The English and the German poets of the early nineteenth century, the so -called Romanticists, frequently invoked the Greek gods and especially the Titan Prometheus. The expression “Romanticism” is probably not adequate for that literary time period in Europe because there was nothing romantic about that epoch or for that matter about the prose of authors such as Coleridge, Byron, or Schiller, who often referred to the ancient Greek deities:

Whilst the smiling earth ye governed still,
And with rapture’s soft and guiding hand
Led the happy nations at your will,
Beauteous beings from the fable-land!
Whilst your blissful worship smiled around,
Ah! how different was it in that day!
When the people still thy temples crowned,
Venus Amathusia![^5]

Many English and German Romanticists were political realists and not daydreamers, as modern textbooks are trying to depict them. All of them had a fine foreboding of the coming dark ages. Most of them can be described as thinkers of the tragic, all the more as many of them end-ed their lives tragically. Many, who wanted to arrest the merciless flow of time, ended up using drugs. A poetic drug of choice among those “pagan” Romanticists in the early nineteenth-century Europe was opi-um and its derivative, the sleeping beauty laudanum.[^6]

Myth and religion are not synonymous, although they are often used synonymously—depending again on the mood and political beliefs of the storyteller, the interpreter, or the word abuser. There is a difference between religion and myth—a difference, as stated above, depending more on the interpreter and less on the etymological differences between these two words. Some will persuasively argue that the miracles per-formed by Jesus Christ were a series of Levantine myths, a kind of Oriental hocus-pocus designed by an obscure Galilean drifter in order to fool the rootless, homeless, raceless, and multicultural masses in the dying days of Rome.[^7]

Some of our Christian contemporaries will, of course, reject such statements. If such anti-Christian remarks were uttered loudly today in front of a large church congregation, or in front of devout Christians, it may lead to public rebuke.

In the modern liberal system, the expression “the religion of liberalism” can have a derisory effect, even if not intended. The word “religion” derives from the Latin word religare, which means to bind together or to tie together. In the same vein some modern writers and historians use the expression “the religion of the Holocaust” without necessarily assigning to the noun “religion” a pejorative or abusive meaning and without wishing to denigrate Jews.[^8]

However, the expression “the religion of the Holocaust” definitely raises eyebrows among the scribes of the modern liberal system given that the memory of the Holocaust is not meant to enter the realm of religious or mythical transcendence, but instead remain in the realm of secular, rational belief. It must be viewed as an undisputed historical fact. The memory of the Holocaust, however, has ironically acquired quasi-transcendental features going well beyond a simple historical narrative. It has become a didactic message stretching well beyond a given historical time period or a given people or civilization, thus escaping any time frame and any scientific measurement. The notion of its “uniqueness” seems to be the trait of all monotheistic religions which are hardly in need of historical proof, let alone of forensic or material documentation in order to assert themselves as universally credible.

The ancestors of modern Europeans, the ancient polytheist Greeks, were never tempted to export their gods or myths to distant foreign peoples. By contrast, Judeo -Christianity and Islam have a universal message, just like their secular modalities, liberalism and communism. Failure to accept these Islamic or Christian beliefs or, for that matter, deriding the modern secular myths embedded today in the liberal system, may result in the persecution or banishment of modern heretics, often under the legal verbiage of protecting “human rights” or “protecting the memory of the dead,” or “fighting against intolerance.”.[^9]

There is, however, a difference between “myth” and “religion,” although these words are often used synonymously. Each religion is history-bound; it has a historical beginning and it contains the projection of its goals into a distant future. After all, we all measure the flow of time from the real or the alleged birth of Jesus Christ. We no longer measure the flow of time from the fall of Troy_, ab urbem condita_, as our Roman ancestors did. The same Christian frame of time measurement is true not just for the Catholic Vatican today, or the Christian-inspired, yet very secular European Union, but also for an overtly atheist state such as North Korea. So do Muslims count their time differently—since the Hegira (i.e., the flight of Muhammad from Mecca), and they still spiritually dwell in the fifth century, despite the fact that most states where Muslims form a majority use modern Western calendars. We can observe that all religions, including the secular ones, unlike myths, are located in a historical time frame, with well-marked beginnings and with clear projections of historical end-times.

On a secular level, for contemporary dedicated liberals, the true un-disputed “religion” (which they, of course, never call “religion”) started in 1776, with the day of the American Declaration of Independence, whereas the Bolsheviks began enforcing their “religion” in 1917. For all of them, all historical events prior to those fateful years are considered symbols of “the dark ages.”

What myth and religion do have in common, however, is that they both rest on powerful symbolism, on allegories, on proverbs, on rituals, on initiating labors, such as the ones the mythical Hercules endured, or the riddles Jason had to solve with his Argonauts in his search for the Golden Fleece.[^10] In a similar manner, the modern ideology of liberalism, having become a quasi-secular religion, consists also of a whole set and subsets of myths where modern heroes and anti-heroes appear to be quite active. Undoubtedly, modern liberals sternly reject expressions such as “the liberal religion,” “the liberal myth,” or “the liberal cult.” By contrast, they readily resort to the expressions such as “the fascist myth” or “the communist myth,” or “the Islamo-fascist myth” whenever they wish to denigrate or criminalize their political opponents. The modern liberal system possesses also its own canons and its own sets of rituals and incantations that need to be observed by contemporary believers— particularly when it comes to the removal of political heretics.

Myths are generally held to be able to thrive in primitive societies only. Yet based on the above descriptions, this is not always the case. Ancient Greece had a fully developed language of mythology, yet on the spiritual and scientific level it was a rather advanced society. Ancient Greek mythology had little in common with the mythology of today’s Polynesia whose inhabitants also cherish their own myths, but whose level of philosophical or scientific inquiry is not on a par with that of the ancient Greeks.

Did Socrates or Plato or Aristotle believe in the existence of harpies, Cyclops, Giants, or Titans? Did they believe in their gods or were their gods only the personified projects of their rituals? Very likely they did believe in their gods, but not in the way we think they did. Some modern scholars of the ancient Greek mythology support this thesis: “The dominant modern view is the exact opposite. For modern ritualists and indeed for most students of Greek religion in the late nineteenth and throughout the twentieth century, rituals are social agendas that are in conception and origin prior to the gods, who are regarded as mere human constructs that have no reality outside the religious belief system that created them.”.[^11]

One can argue that the symbolism in the myths of ancient Greece had an entirely different significance for the ancient Greeks than it does for our contemporaries. The main reason lies in the desperate effort of the moderns to rationally explain away the mythical world of their ancestors by using rationalist concepts and symbols. Such an ultrarational drive for the comprehension of the distant and the unknown is largely due to the unilinear, monotheist mindset inherited from Judaism and from its offshoot Christianity and later on from the Enlightenment. In the same vein, the widespread modern political belief in progress, as Georges Sorel wrote a century ago, can also be observed as a secularization of the biblical paradise myth. “The theory of progress was adopted as a dogma at the time when the bourgeoisie was the conquering class; thus one must see it as a bourgeois doctrine.”[^12]

The Western liberal system sincerely believes in the myth of perpetual progress. Or to put it somewhat crudely, its disciples argue that the purchasing power of citizens must grow indefinitely. Such a linear and optimistic mindset, directly inherited from the Enlightenment, prevents modern citizens in the European Union and America from gaining a full insight into the mental world of their ancestors, thereby depriving them of the ability to conceive of other social and political realities. Undoubtedly, White Americans and Europeans have been considerably affected by the monotheistic mindset of Judaism and its less dogmatic offshoot, Christianity, to the extent that they have now considerable difficulties in conceptualizing other truths and other levels of knowledge.

It needs to be stressed, though, that ancient European myths have a strong component of the tragic bordering on outright nihilism. Due to the onslaught of the modern myth of progress, the quasi-inborn sense of the tragic, which was until recently a unique character trait of the White European heritage, has fallen into oblivion. In the modern liberal system the notion of the tragic is often viewed as a social aberration among individuals professing skepticism or voicing pessimism about the future of the modern liberal system. Nothing remains static in the notion of the tragic. The sheer exuberance of a hero can lead a moment later to his catastrophe. The tragic trait is most visible in the legendary Sophocles’ tragedy Oedipus at Colonus when Oedipus realizes that he is doomed forever for having unknowingly killed his father and for having un-knowingly had an incestuous relationship with his mother. Yet he struggles in vain to the very end in order to escape his destiny. Here is the often quoted line Nr. 1225, i.e., the refrain of the Chorus:

Not to be born is past all prizing best; but when a man has seen the light this is next best by far, that with all speed he should go thither whence he has come.[^13]

The tragic consists in the fact that insofar as one strives to avoid a catastrophe, one actually brings a catastrophe upon himself. Such a tragic state of mind is largely rejected by the proponents of the liberal myth of progress.

Myths and the Tragic: the Coming of the Titanic Age

Without myths there is no tragic, just like without the Titans there can be no Gods. It was the twelve Titans who gave birth to the Gods and not the other way around. It was the titanesque Kronos who gave birth to Zeus, and then, after being dethroned by his son Zeus, forced to dwell with his fellow Titans in the underworld. But one cannot rule out that the resurrection of the head Titan Kronos, along with the other Titans, may reoccur again, perhaps tomorrow, or perhaps in an upcoming eon, thus enabling the recommencement of the new titanic age. After all Prometheus was himself a Titan, although, as a dissident Titan, he had decided to be on the side of the Gods and combat his own fellow Titans. Here is how Friedrich Georg Jünger, an avid student of the ancient Greek myths and the younger brother of the famous contemporary essayist Ernst Jünger, sees it:

_Neither are the Titans unrestrained power-hungry beings, nor do they scorn the law; rather, they are the rulers over a legal system whose necessity must never be put into doubt. In an awe -inspiring fashion, it is the flux of primordial elements over which they rule, holding bridle and reins in their hands, as seen in Helios. They are the guardians, custodians, supervisors, and the guides of order. They are the founders unfolding beyond chaos, as pointed out by Homer in his remarks about Atlas who shoulders the long columns holding the heavens and the Earth. Their rule rules out any confusion, any disorderly power performance. Rather, they constitute a powerful deterrent against chaos.[^14]

Nothing remains new for the locked-up Titans: they know every-thing. They are the central feature in the cosmic eternal return. The Titans are not the creators of chaos, although they reside closer to chaos and are, therefore, better than the Gods—more aware of possible chaotic times. They can be called telluric deities, and it remains to be seen whether in the near future they may side up with some chthonic monsters, such as those described by the novelist H. P. Lovecraft.

It seems that the Titans are the necessary element in the cosmic balance, although they have not received due acknowledgment by contemporary students of ancient and modern mythologies. The Titans are the central feature in the study of the will to power and each White man who demonstrates this will has a good ingredient of the Titanic spirit:

What is Titanic about man? The Titanic trait occurs everywhere and it can be described in many ways. Titanic is a man who completely relies only upon himself and has boundless confidence in his own powers. This confidence absolves him, but at the same time it isolates him in a Promethean mode. It gives him a feeling of independence, albeit not devoid of arrogance, violence, and defiance.[^15]

Today, in our disenchanted world, from which all gods have departed, the resurgence of the Titans may be an option for a dying Western civilization. The Titans and the titanic humans are known to be out-spoken about their supreme independence, their aversion to cutting deals, and their uncompromising, impenitent attitude. What they need in addition is a good portion of luck, or fortuna.

Notes

[1]: Louis Rougier, La mystique démocratique (Paris: Albatros, 1983), p. 13. [2]: Nicole Belmont, Paroles païennes: mythe et folklore (Paris: Imago, 1986) quotes on page 106 the German-born English Orientalist and philologist Max Müller who sees in ancient myths “a disease of language,” an approach criticized by the anthropological school of thought. His critic Andrew Lang writes: “The general problem is this: Has language—especially language in a state of ‘disease,’ been the great source of the mythology of the world? Or does mythology, on the whole, represent the survival of an old stage of thought—not caused by language—from which civilised men have slowly emancipated themselves? Mr. Max Müller is of the former, anthropologists are of the latter, opinion.” Cf. Andrew Lang, Modern Mythology (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1897), p.x. [3]: Thomas Bullfinch, The Golden Age of Myth and Legend (London: Wordsworth Editions, 1993). [4]: See the German classicist, Walter F. Otto, The Homeric Gods: The Spiritual Significance of Greek Religion, trans. Moses Hadas (North Stratford, NH: Ayer Company Publishers, 2001). Otto is quite critical of Christian epistemology. Some excerpts from this work appeared in French translation also in his article, “Les Grecs et leurs dieux,” in the quarterly Krisis (Paris), no. 23 (January 2000). [5]: Friedrich Schiller, The Gods of Greece, trans. E. A. Bowring. ttp://www.bartleby.com/270/9/2.html [6]: Tomislav Sunic, “The Right Stuff,” Chronicles (October 1996), 21–22; Tomislav Sunic, “The Party Is Over,” The Occidental Observer (November 5, 2009). www.theoccidentalobserver.net/authors/Sunic-Drugs.html [7]: Tomislav Sunic, “Marx, Moses, and the Pagans in the Secular City,” CLIO: A Journal of Literature, History, and the Philosophy of History 24, no. 2 (Winter 1995). [8]: Gilad Atzmon, The Wandering Who? A Study of Jewish Identity Politics (Winchester, UK: Zero Books, 2011), 148–49. [9]: Alain de Benoist, “Die Methoden der Neuen Inquisition,” in Schöne vernetzte Welt (Tübingen: Hohenrain Verlag, 2001), p. 190–205. [10]: Michael Grant, Myths of the Greeks and Romans (London: Phoenix, 1989), p. 289–303. [11]: Albert Henrichs, “What Is a Greek God?,” in The Gods of Ancient Greece, ed. Jan Bremmer and Andrew Erskine (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), p- 26. [12]: Georges Sorel, Les Illusions du progrès (Paris: Marcel Rivière, 1911), p. 5–6. [13]: Sophocles, Oedipus at Colonus, in The Complete Plays of Sophocles, ed. and trans. R. C. Jebb (New York: Bantam Books, 1979), p. 250. [14]: Friedrich Georg Jünger, Die Titanen (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1944), p. 89–90. [15]: bid., 105.

The Curse of Victimhood and Negative Identity (israelnationalnews.com, January 30, 2015)

Days and months of atonement keep accumulating on the European wall calendar. The days of atonement however, other than commemorating the dead, often function as a tool in boosting political legitimacy of a nation – often at the expense of another nearby nation struggling for its identity.

While the media keep reassuring us that history is crawling to an end, what we are witnessing instead is a sudden surge of new historical victimhoods, particularly among the peoples of Eastern Europe. As a rule, each individual victimhood requires a forever expanding number of its own dead within the context of unavoidable lurking fascist demons.

Expressed in the postmodern lingo of today, the modern media-made image trivializes the real death and dying into an image of a hyperreal and surreal non-event. For instance, the historical consciousness of Serbs vs. Croats, Poles vs. Germans, not to mention the victimological memories of the mutually embattled Ukrainian and Russian nationalists today, are becoming more “historical” than their previously recorded respective histories.

It seems that European nationalists do not fight any longer for their living co-ethnics, but primarily for their dead. As a result, as Efraim Zuroff correctly stated, “in post-Communist eastern Europe, [they're] trying to play down the crimes of the Nazi cooperators and claim that the crimes of the Communists were just as bad.” (AS,” Top Nazi Hunter: Eastern Europe Rewrote the Holocaust,” by Benny Toker, Ari Yashar, January 27, 2015).

Yet Zuroff’s s remarks, however sharp, miss the wider historical context. Any day of atonement or, for that matter, any day of repentance on behalf of a victimized group, is highly conflictual, if not warmongering by its nature.

It was in the name of antifascist victimology and their real and surreal fear of the resurrection of the anticipated fascist Croatia, that local Serbs staged a bloody rebellion in Croatia in 1991. It was in the name of their own post -WWII victims, killed by the victorious Communists on the killing fields of Bleiburg in Austria in May 1945, that Croats, forty-five years thereafter, began their war of secession from the Yugoslav grip. The Ukrainians still nourish the memory of Holodomor, the Poles nurture their memories of Kaytn, the Cossacks commemorate their victims in Linz, the Russians have their numerous Kolymas, the Germans their Dresdens — locations standing not only as memorial sites, but also as symbols of just retribution in the eyes of the Other.

Crimes committed by the Communists in Eastern Europe during and after World War II were not just Allied collateral damage, or a freak, unintended accident, but a planned effort to remove millions of undesirables.

Almost by definition this raises time again the painful symbolism of Auschwitz, a locality standing not only for a specific historic and clear-cut site of large-scale dying, but also as a didactic location designated for teaching the world the meaning of worldwide tolerance. Of course, the liberation of the Auschwitz camp by the lauded Soviet troops, raises a side question regarding their previous itinerary, especially if one considers that millions of East European and ethnic German civilians were either displaced or killed by the very same Soviet troops on their way to Auschwitz in January 1945.

How genuine were the tears of European statesmen and politicians at the recent commemoration event for the Auschwitz dead will remain a matter of wide speculation and wild guesses. Suffice it to note that if one were to take a peek into the recent history of France, in 1940 the entire Communist and left-leaning intelligentsia sided with the pro-fascist Vichy regime. Of course, in the aftermath of WWII it became politically expedient for the French intellectuals to posture as ardent philo-Semites and learn hastily the antifascist vulgate.

Another case in point are modern Croat politicians, who almost without any exception, prior to 1990 were strong advocates of the unity of the Yugoslav Communist state, as well as staunch purveyors of the socialist “self-managing” economy — only to rebrand themselves shortly thereafter into either rabid nationalists or Brussels-gravitating free marketeers.

The same feigned mea culpa scenario can be observed today among the German political class which had gone a step further, as seen in the recent verbal gestures of ex-president Horst Köhler and acting president Joachim Gauck, the latter of whom stated that "there is no Germanidentity without Auschwitz.”

One can thence surmise that without the memory of Auschwitz, EU politicians would likely be in goose-stepping unison, marching to the enchanting tunes of Giovinezza or the Horst Wessel Lied.

Some scholars seem to be well aware of the mendacious mentality of contemporary European politicians. As Shmuel Trigano notes, “while setting itself up as “new Israel,” the West recognizes in Judaism a factual, if not a juridical jurisdiction over itself.” His words signify that the West has become “Jewish “to the extent that for centuries it had kept denying the Jews their identity. It follows from this that the strange verbal construct “Judeo-Christianity” is not an elusive and dangerous oxymoron at all, but rather a symbol of self-defeating and false identity.

On the one hand, the latter day European victimologists nurture latent anti-Jewish feelings, while on the other hand, they continue formulating their ethical ukases and legal judgments almost exclusively on secularized teachings of the Hebrew sages.

Since the end of the cold war, the political class all over Europe claims its own bizarre brand of antifascist victimology by resurrecting the fascist straw man, as if the invocation of the fascist demonology could exonerate it from its fascist past and possibly give it a free pass in the eyes of Jews. It appears that liberal democracies in the EU and the USA cannot function at all without regurgitating fake philo-Semitic terms of endearment on the one hand, while indulging in a false self-denial on the other.

It might be worth considering setting up an international interfaith conference where scholars of different ethnic and intellectualbackgrounds could discuss both the positive and the negative sides of different victimhoods. As of now, diverse and often conflicting victimhoods are not likely to bring about genuine reconciliation among different Europe peoples, let alone solve the rapidly emerging war of victimhoods in the increasingly racially fractured and balkanized European Union. Self-serving victimhoods only exacerbate the false prejudices of the Other and lay the ground for new conflicts.

Mr. Sunic is author, former US professor of political science, and former Croat diplomat. One of his recent books is La Croatie ; un pays par défaut ? (2010).

link: israelnationalnews.com

Tom Sunic

Dr. Tom Sunic, the writer, born in Zagreb, is an author, former US professor of political...

Friedrich Georg Jünger: The Titans and the Coming of the Titanic Age (The Occidental Quarterly, vol. 14, no. 2, Summer 2014)

Below is my translation of several passages from the last two chapters of Friedrich Georg Jünger’s little known book, Die Titanen (The Titans, 1944).1 Only the subtitles are mine. F. G. Jünger was the younger brother of Ernst Jünger and wrote extensively about ancient Greek mythology. His studies on the meaning of Prometheanism and Titanism are indispensable for a better understanding of the devastating effects of the modern belief in progress and the role of technology in our postmodern societies. Outside the German-speaking countries, F. G. Jünger’s work remains largely unknown, although he had a decisive influence on his renowned brother, Ernst Jünger. Some parts of F. G. Jünger’s other book, Griechische Götter (The Greek Gods, 1943), with a similar topic, and containing also some passages from Die Titanen, were recently translated into French (Les Titans et les dieux, 2013).2

In the footsteps of Friedrich Nietzsche and along with hundreds of German philosophers, novelists, poets, and scientists, such as Martin Heidegger, Oswald Spengler, Carl Schmitt, Ludwig Clauss, and Gott-fried Benn, whose work became the object of criminalization by cultural Bolsheviks and the Frankfurt School after World War II, F. G. Jünger can also be tentatively put in the category of “cultural conservative revolutionaries” who characterized the political, spiritual, and cultural climate in Europe between the two world wars.

Ancient European myths, legends, and folk tales are often derided by some scholars, including some Christian theologians who claim to see in them gross re-enactments of European barbarism, superstition, and sexual promiscuity. However, if a reader or a scholar immerses himself in the symbolism of the European myths, let alone if he tries to decipher the allegorical meaning of diverse creatures in the myths, such as the scenes from the Orphic rituals, the hellhole of Tartarus, or the carnage in the Nibelungenlied, or the final divine battle in Ragnarök, then those mythical scenes take on an entirely different meaning. After all, in our modern so-called enlightened and freedom-loving liberal societies, citizens are also entangled in a profusion of bizarre infra-political myths, in a myriad of weird hagiographic tales, especially those dealing with World War II victimhoods, as well as countless multicultural hoaxes enforced under penalty of law. Therefore, understanding the ancient European myths means, first and foremost, reading between the lines and strengthening one’s sense of the metaphor.

There persists a dangerous misunderstanding between White nationalists professing paganism versus White nationalists professing Chris-tian beliefs. The word “paganism” has acquired a pejorative meaning, often associated with childish behavior of some obscure New Age individuals carrying burning torches or reading the entrails of dead animals. This is a fundamentally false conception of the original meaning of paganism. “Pagans,” or better yet polytheists, included scores of thinkers from antiquity, such as Heraclitus, Plato, Seneca, who were not at all like many modern self-styled and self-proclaimed “pagans” worshipping dogs or gazing at the setting sun. Being a “pagan” denotes a method of conceptualizing the world beyond the dualism of “either-or.” The pagan outlook rejects all dogmas and looks instead at the notion of the political or the historical from diverse and conflicting perspectives. Figuratively speaking, the plurality of gods means also the plurality of different beliefs and different truths. One can be a good Christian but also a good “pagan.” For that matter, even the “pagan” Ernst Jünger, F. G. Jünger’s older brother, converted to Catholicism and had a very Catholic burial in 1998.

When F. G. Jünger published his books on the Titans and the gods in 1943 and in 1944, Germany lay in ruins, thus ominously reflecting F. G. Jünger’s earlier premonitions about the imminent clash of the Titans. With the gods now having departed from our disenchanted and desacralized White Europe and White America, we might do well to have another look at the slumbering Titans who had once successfully fought against Chaos, only to be later forcefully overthrown by their own di-vine progeny.

Are the slumbering Titans our political option today? F. G. Jünger’s book is important insofar as it offers a reader a guide for understanding a likely reawakening of the Titans and for decoding the meaning of the new, fast approaching chaos.

The Titans: Custodians of Law and Order

The Titans are not the Gods, even though they generate the Gods and relish divine reverence in the kingdom of Zeus. The world in which the Titans rule is a world without the Gods. Whoever desires to imagine a kosmos atheos, i.e., a godless cosmos, that is, a cosmos not as such as depicted by natural sciences, will find it there. The Titans and the Gods differ, and, given that their differences are visible in their behavior to-ward man and in view of the fact that man himself experiences on his own as to how they rule, man, by virtue of his own experience, is able to make a distinction between them.

Neither are the Titans unrestrained, power hungry beings, nor do they scorn the law; rather, they are the rulers over a legal system whose necessity must never be put in doubt. In an awe-inspiring fashion, it is the flux of primordial elements over which they rule, holding bridle and reins in their hands, as seen in Helios. They are the guardians, custodians, supervisors, and guides of the order. They are the founders unfolding beyond chaos, as pointed out by Homer in his remarks about Atlas, who shoulders the long pillars supporting the heavens and the Earth. Their rule precludes any confusion, any disorderly exertion of power. Rather, they constitute a powerful deterrent against chaos.

The Titans and the Gods match up with each other. Just as Zeus stands in for Cronus, so does Poseidon stand in opposition to Oceanus, or for that matter Hyperion and his son Helios in opposition to Apollo, or Coeus and Phoebe in opposition to Apollo and Artemis, or Selene in opposition to Artemis.

The Titans against the Gods

What distinguishes the kingdom of Cronus from the kingdom of Zeus? One thing is for certain; the kingdom of Cronus is not a kingdom of the son. The sons are hidden within Cronus, who devoured those he himself had generated, the sons being now hidden in his dominion, whereas Zeus is kept away from Cronus by Rhea, who hides and raises Zeus in the caverns. And given that Cronus comports himself in such a manner, his kingdom will never be a kingdom of the father. Cronus does not want to be a father because fatherhood is equivalent with a constant menace to his rule. To him fatherhood signifies an endeavor and prearrangement aimed at his downfall.

What does Cronus want, anyway? He wants to preserve the cycle of the status quo over which he presides; he wants to keep it unchanged. He wants to toss and turn it within himself from one eon to another eon. Preservation and perseverance were already the hallmark of his father. Although his father

Uranus did not strive toward the Titanic becoming, he did, however, desire to continue his reign in the realm of spacious-ness. Uranus was old, unimaginably old, as old as metal and stones. He was possessed of iron-like strength that ran counter to the process of be-coming. But Cronus is also old. Why is he so old? Can this fluctuation of the Titanic forces take on at the same time traits of the immovable and unchangeable? Yes, of course it can, if one observes it from the perspective of the return, or from the point of view of the return of the same. If one attempts it, one can uncover the mechanical side in this ceaseless flux of movement. The movement unveils itself as a rigid and inviolable law.

The Infinite Sadness of the Titans

How can we describe the sufferings of the Titans? How much do they suffer anyway, and what do they suffer from? The sound of grief uttered by the chained Prometheus induces Hermes to derisive remarks about the same behavior which is unknown to Zeus. Insofar as the Titans are in the process of moving, we must therefore also conceive of them as the objects of removal. Their struggle is onerous; it is filled with anxiety of becoming. And their anxiety means suffering. Grandiose things are being accomplished by the Titans, but grandiose things are being imposed on them too. And because the Titans are closer to chaos than the Gods are, chaotic elements reveal themselves amidst them more saliently. No necessity appears as yet in chaos because chaos has not yet been meas-ured off by any legal system. The necessity springs up only when it can be gauged by virtue of some lawfulness. This is shown in the case of Uranus and Cronus. The necessary keeps increasing insofar as lawful-ness increases; it gets stronger when the lawful movements occur, that is, when the movements start reoccurring over and over again.

Among the Titanesses this sadness is most visible in the grief of Rhea whose motherhood was harmed. It is also visible in the mourning of Mnemosyne who ceaselessly conjures up the past. The suffering of this Titaness carries something of sublime magnificence. In her inaccessible solitude, no solace can be found. Alone, she must muse about herself—a dark image of the sorrows of life. The suffering of the Titans, after their downfall, reveals itself in all its force. The vanquished Titan represents one of the greatest images of suffering. Toppled, thrown down under into the ravines beneath the earth, sentenced to passivity, the Titan knows only how to carry, how to heave, and how to struggle with the burden—similar to the burden borne by the Caryatids.

The Self-sufficient Gods

The Olympian Gods, however, do not suffer like the Titans. They are happy with themselves; they are self-sufficient. They do not ignore the pain and sufferings of man. They in fact conjure up these sufferings, but they also heal them. In Epicurean thought, in the Epicurean world of happiness, we observe the Gods dwelling in between the worlds, divorced from the life of the Earth and separated from the life of men, to a degree that nothing can ever reach out to them and nothing can ever come from them. They enjoy themselves in an eternal halcyon bliss that cannot be conveyed by words.

The idea of the Gods being devoid of destiny is brought out here insofar as it goes well beyond all power and all powerlessness; it is as if the Gods had been placed in a deepest sleep, as if they were not there for us. Man, therefore, has no need to think of them. He must only leave them alone in their blissful slumber. But this is a philosophical thought, alien to the myth.

Under Cronus, man is part of the Titanic order. Man does not yet stand in opposition to the order—an opposition founded in the reign of Zeus. He experiences now the forces of the Titans; he lives alongside them. The fisherman and boatman venturing out on the sea are in their Titanic element. The same happens with the shepherd, the farmer, the hunter in their realm. Hyperion, Helios, and Eos determine their days, Selene regulates their nights. They observe the running Iris, they see the Horae dancing and spinning around throughout the year. They observe the walk of the nymphs Pleiades and Hyades in the skies. They recognize the rule of the great Titanic mothers, Gaia, Rhea, Mnemosyne, and that of Gaia-Themis. Above all of them rules and reigns the ancient Cronus, who keeps a record of what happens in the skies, on the earth, and in the seas.

Titanic Necessity versus Divine Destiny

The course of human life is inextricably linked to the Titanic order. Life makes one whole with it; the course of life cannot be divorced from this order. It is the flow of time, the year’s course, the day’s course. The tides and the stars are on the move. The process resembles a ceaseless flow of the river. Cronus reigns over it and makes sure it keeps return-ing. Everything returns and everything repeats itself—everything is the same. This is the law of the Titans; this is their necessity. In their motion a strict cyclical order manifests itself. In this order there is a regular cy-clical return that no man can escape. Man’s life is a reflection of this cyclic order; it turns around in a Titanic cycle of Cronus.

Man has no destiny here, in contrast to the demigods and the heroes who all have it. The kingdom of Zeus is teeming with the lives and deeds of heroes, offering an inexhaustible material to the songs, to the epics and to the tragedies. In the kingdom of Cronus, however, there are no heroes; there is no Heroic Age. For man, Cronus, and the Titans have no destiny; they are themselves devoid of destiny. Does Helios, does Selene, does Eos have a destiny? Wherever the Titanic necessity rules, there cannot be a destiny. But the Gods are also deprived of destiny wherever divine necessity prevails, wherever man grasps the Gods in a fashion that is not in opposition to them. But a man whom the Gods confront has a destiny. A man whom the Titans confront perishes; he succumbs to a catastrophe.

We can say, however, that whatever happens to man under the rule of the Titans is a lot easier than under the rule of the Gods. The burden imposed on man is much lighter. . . .

What happens when the Gods turn away from man and when they leave him on his own? Wherever they make themselves unrecognizable to man, wherever their care for man fades away, wherever man’s fate begins and ends without them, there always happens the same thing. The Titanic forces return and they validate their claims to power. Where no Gods are, there are the Titans. This is a relationship of a legal order which no man can escape wherever he may turn. The Titans are immor-tal. They are always there. They always strive to re-establish their old dominion of their foregone might. This is the dream of the Titanic race of the Iapetos, and all the Iapetides who dream about it. The earth is penetrated and filled up with the Titanic forces. The Titans sit in am-bush, on the lookout, ready to break out and break up their chains and restore the empire of Cronus.

Titanic Man

What is Titanic about man? The Titanic trait occurs everywhere and can be described in many ways. Titanic is a man who relies completely upon himself and has boundless confidence in his own powers. This confidence absolves him, but at the same time it isolates him in a Promethean fashion. It gives him a feeling of independence, albeit not devoid of arrogance, violence, and defiance. Titanic is a quest for unfettered freedom and independence. However, wherever this quest is to be seen there appears a regulatory factor, a mechanically operating necessity that emerges as a correction to such a quest. This is the end of all the Promethean striving, which is well-known to Zeus only. The new world created by Prometheus is not.

Dr. Tomislav Sunic is a former professor of political science, an author, and a board member of the American Freedom Party. He the author of several books, including Against Democracy and Equality: The European New Right and Homo Americanus: Child of the Postmodern Age.

Notes

  1. Friedrich Georg Jünger, Die Titanen (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1944). ↩

  2. Friedrich Georg Jünger, Les Titans et les dieux: mythes grecs, trans. François Poncet (Paris: Krisis, 2013). ↩

MARSHAL TITO'S KILLING FIELDS (Croatian Victims of the Yugoslav Secret Police outside former Communist Yugoslavia: 1945-1990)

Pravda

Tomislav Sunic and Nikola Stedul: MARSHAL TITO'S KILLING FIELDS (Croatian Victims of the Yugoslav Secret Police outside former Communist Yugoslavia: 1945-1990)

The ongoing legal proceedings in the Hague against Serb and Croat war crimes suspects, including the Serbian ex-president Slobodan Milosevic, must be put into wider perspective. The unfortunate and often irrational hatred between Serbs and Croats had for decades been stirred up and kept alive by the communist Yugoslav secret police. The longevity of the artificial, multiethnic Yugoslavia was not just in the interest of Yugoslav communists but also of Western states. The long-time Western darling, the late Yugoslav communist leader, Marshall Josip Broz Tito, had a far bigger share of ethnic cleansings and mass killings. Yet, for decades, his crimes were hidden and went unreported in the West.

The first part of the following essay represents a brief excursion into the Croat victimology. The second part covers the poor legality of the International Criminal Court in the Hague.

When talking or writing about state terror in former Communist Yugoslavia, one must inevitably mention those who were either assassinated or wounded outside the jurisdiction of that state. The assassination attempts were carried out by Yugoslav secret police (OZNA, UDBA) agents - although the decision "to make a kill" had to be first reached at the very top of the late Yugoslav Communist regime. During Communist ex-Yugoslavia, there was the whole spectrum of UDBA victims, particularly among former Croatian political emigres living under foreign Western jurisdictions. Of course, this sensitive theme can be addressed from a variety of different perspectives: historical, sociopolitical, psychological, ethical, and theological. Statistics or the "body count" of the UDBA terror is very important - but what appears to be even far more relevant are the persons who carried out those killings. Who gave the orders, and what were their motives? Such a wide-range analysis can, hopefully, be of some help, particularly in understanding today the poor legitimacy of the Tribunal in the Hague.

Moreover, such a broad-based approach is all the more important as the results of UDBA lawlessness went beyond its immediate victims. Each act of silencing a different, or dissident-minded opponent, or to physically eliminate somebody who refuses to pledge allegiance to a given state ideology, often exacerbates opposing views. Indeed, it can lead to a wider armed conflict, resulting in wars, mass killings, ethnic cleansings, etc. These end-results (which were recently confirmed by the violent break-up of ex-Yugoslavia and the subsequent Communist party -inspired aggression on Croatia, were also part and parcel of a larger socio-political package, leading to, but also deriving from, the spiral of mass psychosis, nationalist mythologies, general insecurity, the culture of resentment, and the resurgence of most primeval animal instincts amidst wide layers of population.

The Sense of Victimhood and the Meaning of Forgiveness

Regarding the scope of the Yugoslav secret police (UDBA) terror, one must not attribute them an excessive importance. In the last analysis, victims, following World War II in Yugoslavia, can be counted in hundreds of thousands, and victims in the recent war in the Balkans in several dozens of thousands. Therefore, attributing special significance to a relative small number, i.e. over a hundred victims of the UDBA terror in foreign countries, may sound biased - particularly when one compares this relatively low figure to the much higher figures mentioned above. Yet the difference in significance regarding the volume of the crime does not minimize the gravity of the crime; all victims are equally important. The only difference is how and in which historical circumstances these killings took place, and what is the causal relationship between the post- Word War II victims, UDBA victims, and Croat and Serb victims of the recent war. It is more or less taken for granted that mass killings occur in a war like scenario. Yet victims of the UDBA terror, which are discussed here, happened in peace time, in free and democratic Western countries, i.e., in societies in which everybody is entitled to his opinion and his pursuit of happiness. The criminal acts by the UDBA were committed abroad, and for them the Yugoslav Communist government (and their today's recycled followers both in Croatia and Serbia) bear direct responsibility. Moreover, those post-World War II crimes went beyond the legal framework of Communist ex-Yugoslavia.

The question must be raised as to why the Communist regime, even after the establishment of Communist Yugoslavia in 1945, continued to assassinate its political opponents, including those who resided in Western countries. One might believe that political opponents of Communist Yugoslavia who lived in the West did not pose a tangible threat to the ruling Yugoslav Communist League. This is all the more important considering the fact that Western countries, in which Croatian political emigres lived, or still live, were by no means sympathetic to the vision of establishing an independent Croatian state. Quite to the contrary; Western countries often did their utmost to preserve the "unity and integrity" of Communist Yugoslavia. But a threat to Communist Yugoslavia from Croatian emigre Western-based circles did exist - for a simple reason that the state of Yugoslavia and its Communist elite could not rely on the good will of the Croatian people. This weakness of Communist Yugoslavia did represent a problem to the Yugoslav authorities, because any state and any regime without legitimacy (regardless of its claim to legality), unless founded on the will of its citizens, does not have long-term survivability. The regime in place could be upheld only by sheer force. In an uncompromising effort to secure its survival, the Yugoslav Communist regime decided, very early on, to "neutralize" all separatist Croats, including those living in Western countries. This method of "neutralization" often took place in a beastly manner. The new Republic of Croatia, today, does not need to be kept alive by using force against its dissidents, because its support is solidly anchored amidst the majority of its citizens. It does not have to fear a handful of individuals, or a handful of small extremist parties. Far more dangerous for the survival of Croatia are the individuals, who in the name of some "ultra-Croatiandom," or some "mega-Croatian" statehood, continue to act in a radically opposite way to their much vaunted agendas. This danger is all the more great because it often operates under cover of fake Croat patriotism. Very early on, the ring leaders of the Communist machinery realized that their policy of "Yugoslavenisation" or "Titoisation" could not have positive effects among the Croatian people. Therefore, they viewed anybody who dared advocate the idea of the Croatian state independence, as a mortal enemy. On August 10, 1941, at the very beginning of the formation of Yugoslav Communist partisans units, late President Josip Broz Tito, stipulated that the "provocateurs, traitors must be immediately liquidated." Those who fell into this category were often advocates of Croatian state independence. Following these official Titoistic stipulations, only a few months later, the leader of Slovenian Communist Partisan units, Mr. Evard Kardelj (under his conspiratioral name "Bevac"), in a written report sent to Tito regarding the liquidation of opponents, carried out by his partisan units, noted: "Our machinery of execution is made up of 50 well trained men, armed with pistols and hand grenades. In view of the much increased terror undertaken by the Italian (Fascist) occupying forces, and local Slovenian "Bela Garda" collaborators, we had to increase the number of our activities. These men are capable of everything. Almost every day collaborators and traitors are eliminated along with members of the occupying (Fascist) units, etc. There is no police protection for those whom our VOS takes for a target..."

Classical UDBA Terror

Here is a typical example of Communist terror. On the one hand, Partisan and Communist executions, during WWII in the Balkans were carried out in order to scare the local population; on the other, to incite the occupying Fascist and pro-fascist forces to carry out retribution killings, and create additional mass psychosis, along with the sense of insecurity, further prompting local population to join the Partisan movement directed by the Yugoslav Communist Party - and the Red International.

The task of carrying out this mission was handed over to the OZNA, which later, after Word War II, changed its name to the civilian police security apparatus, under the name of UDBA and the KOS. In fact, as the Communist Partisan movement, as a result of the Allied help, grew stronger, on May 13, 1944 the Yugoslav Partisans formally founded the "Section for the People's Protection" (i.e. OZNA). This organization, among the Croatian people, brings back bad memories, because it was through the OZNA that Communist leadership carried out mass or individual killings, which took place during Word War II and immediately after Word War II. Following the dissolution of the pro-fascist NDH ("Independent State of Croatia") in 1945, the OZNA received the order, immediately after its first round of killings in post-World War II war months, to continue eliminating well-known Croats, who had managed after Word War II to escape and hide in foreign countries.

The early OZNA chose as its first victim Dr. Ivan Protulipac, who was assassinated in Trieste, Italy, on January 31, 1946. Dr. Protulipac was a founder of "The Eagle and Crusading Youth" in the former monarchic Yugoslavia. He was also a successor to Dr. Ivan Merz, the much praised leader of the "Croatian Catholic Youth."

Two and a half years later, i.e., on August 22, 1948, the UDBA tried to kidnap in Salzburg, Austria, Dr. Mato Frkovic, who during Word War II, in a short lived NDH ( "Independent State of Croatia") held a high ranking place in the government. The same year, the OZNA (from then on "UDBA"), assassinated in Austria, Mr. Ilija Abramovic. Only a few months later, on March 16, 1949, the UDBA kidnapped in Rome, Italy, Mr. Drago Jilek, who had worked as the interim Head of the Intelligence Service of the NDH, during Word War II. After the former Chief of the Security of the NDH, Mr. Dido Kvaternik had been deposed from office, Jilek assumed control of the pro-fascist World War II, Croatian UNS ( Ustasha Security Service).

The kidnapping of Drago Jilek by the Yugoslav Communist police agents coincided, strangely enough, with a tragic case of the most prominent Croatian Communist leader, Mr. Andrija Hebrang. It is widely considered that the UDBA wanted to find out what kind of contacts existed during and before World War II between high ranking Croat pro-fascist Ustasha officials and high ranking Croatian Communist and Croatian antifascist officials and intellectuals - whose common and apparent goal was, or may have been, the establishment of an independent Croatian state.

Victims of the Yugoslav Communist Security Service, i.e., the UDBA, included not just pro-fascist Ustashi or anti-communist Domobran ("Home Guard") individuals, or members of former Croatian military units, but also prominent Croatian Communist and Partisan figures, such as the poet, Ivan Goran Kovacic, Dr. Andrija Hebrang, and a former Croatian Communist military officer - turned dissident - Mr. Zvonko Kucar. This further confirms that for the UDBA and the Yugoslav Communist regime, the main criteria for coming to terms with "hostile elements," was not ideological affiliation of the target-victim ("left vs. right"), but primarily the removal of all those who showed any inclination towards any form of Croatian statehood or/and Croatian nationhood.

One-Hundred-Nine Cases of Assassinations and Kidnapping

Obviously, not all details can be mentioned about every UDBA victim; neither can one separately cover all the facts leading to the death or kidnapping of the victims. One must, therefore, focus only on some of the most salient examples of UDBA state terrorist activity: From 1946 to 1949 two assassinations were carried out; one failed attempt of assassination; one kidnapping; one person was reported missing.

From 1950 until 1959 no assassination took place; two failed assassination attempts took place (against the former Ustashi exiled leader, Dr. Ante Pavelic, and Dr. Branimir Jelic); one kidnapping; one failed attempt at kidnapping.

From 1960 until 1969, twenty assassinations took place - all expect one during the period from 1966 to 1969; four failed assassination attempts; one kidnapping ( Dr. Krunoslav Draganovic, in Italy); two persons reported missing ( Mr. Zvonimir Kucar, 1960, and Mr. Geza Pesti, 1965).

From these figures it may be concluded that the number of assassination by the UDBA increased dramatically during that period. The reason for that was the fact that the Yugoslav President Tito, as a follow-up to the important Plenary Congress of the Yugoslav Communist League, which was held on the Island of Briuni in 1966, after having fired his chief of the Yugoslav Security, Mr. Aleksandar Rankovic, decided to loosen up somewhat the repressive tools within Communist Yugoslavia - but to sharpen up repression, i.e. UDBA killings of Croatian emigres outside Yugoslavia, i.e., in Western countries.

From 1970 until 1979 twenty-eight Croat emigres (including the well-known Croatian dissident writer, Mr. Bruno Busic) were assassinated by the UDBA; 13 failed UDBA assassination attempts; one kidnapping (of the Croatian poet Mr. Vjenceslav Cizek); four failed attempts of kidnapping (including the one of the former high ranking exiled Croatian Communist official Franjo Mikulic; one person missing.

Spurred by the crushing of the "Croatian Spring" in December 1971, the Yugoslav Communist regime became particularly intent on eliminating Croatian emigre dissidents - often without any scruples. Thus in 1972, in Italy, a whole Croatian family was killed, Mr. Stjepan Sevo, his spouse and his nine-year old daughter.

In 1975, in Klagenfurt, Austria, a 65 year old Mr. Nikola Martinovic was the target of the UDBA assassination. Mr. Martinovic was known in Croatian emigre circles, before his violent death, as a caretaker of the graves of Croat soldiers and civilians who were the victims of the Yugoslav Communist units in southern Austria, near the town of Bleiburg, in May and June 1945.

The same year, i.e., 1975, shortly before his death, Mr. Martinovic planned to organize large anti-Yugoslav demonstrations in the vicinity of Bleiburg. However, Yugoslav Communist government officials sent a note to the Austrian government, requesting the interdiction of the Croatian emigre mass gathering. Since it did not work, the UDBA had to take the matter into it own hands.

From 1980 to 1989, seventeen emigre Croats were assassinated (including Mr. Stjepan Durekovic, a former high ranking Croatian Communist and head of the state-owned "INA", (largest oil refinery in ex-Yugoslavia); nine failed assassination attempts - including one against myself (Mr. Nikola Stedul, n.t.); and one kidnapping.

From these figures it can be seen that for the period stretching from 1946 to 1990, the OZNA, the UDBA, and the KOS carried out over one hundred assassinations and/or assassination attempts against Croat emigres. Regarding the rough break-down of this figure, it follows: in Western Europe eighty-nine UDBA assassination attempts; nine in North America; six in South America; two in Australia; two in Africa. As far as figures regarding individuals countries are concerned, the majority of assassination and assassination attempts took place in the Federal Republic of Germany - fifty-six; ten in France; nine in Italy.

The total number of UDBA victims is a follows: sixty-seven killed; twenty-nine failed assassination attempts; four successful kidnappings; five failed kidnapping attempts; four persons reported missing - who were in all likelihood also UDBA victims.

Beside UDBA targets of emigre Croats over that period of the same time, there were also twelve emigre Serbs killed; four ethnic Albanians. The above figures are based on various sources, and it is quite likely that all victims have not been counted and covered here, and that the fate of some still remains to be elucidated.

Three Objectives

With each assassination Communist Yugoslavia aimed at achieving three goals: a) to eliminate a political "trouble-maker"; b) to scare other dissidents and emigres both at home and abroad; c) to leave general impression both in Yugoslavia and abroad that Croat emgires were fighting among themselves their own turf war. Each assassination was followed in Communist Yugoslavia's state-controlled journals by words that "Ustashi-Fascist-Croatian nationalists fighting war among their own ranks." The media mega-language of Yugoslav state-sponsored journals must be thoroughly examined. Indeed, many Croats in Communist Yugoslavia were persuaded, as the result of incessant Communist propaganda, that the deaths of emigre Croats was a direct result of underground infighting.

It should be pointed out that any effective organization among Croatian emigres, was virtually nonexistent and, legally speaking, impossible to achieve. All foreign security services kept Croatian emigre groups under strict observation, especially those Croats abroad who intended to overthrow the Yugoslav Communist state. In many cases, Western-based security and intelligence services even worked hand in hand with Yugoslav intelligence services, including the Yugoslav diplomatic corps. Croats abroad, and those in the former Yugoslavia have been well aware of these Western attempts to prevent the dissolution of Yugoslavia, and to make quite costly the establishment of the independent state of Croatia. It is also clear why many Western countries glowingly supported the decades-long Yugoslav and Titoistic experiment - if for no other reason than as a desire to keep status quo in the East-West cleavage, and as a country-pawn in the geopolitical gamble of the Cold War - during which Communist Yugoslavia, as a non-aligned buffer-state played an important role.

Just as the world passively witnessed, in 1991, the break up of Yugoslavia, so too did the world passively observe serial UDBA killings of Croatian political activists abroad. Even the Libyan leader Colonel Moamar Khadafi in an interview with the German Der Spiegel : once said. "Tito sends his agents to the Federal Republic of Germany in order to liquidate Croatian opponents. But Tito's prestige doesn't not suffer at all in Germany. Why should Tito be allowed those things and why am I not allowed to do the same. Moreover, I have never given a personal order to have somebody killed in foreign countries."

The above quotes may be further confirmed by many more further killings of Croatian emigre dissidents - which was barely ever covered in full in the Western media. One example should suffice: When the Russian writer, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn was expelled from the Soviet Union, in 1973, the entire Western media was deluged with protests aimed at the Kremlin handling of this case. By contrast, when the Croatian dissident Bruno Busic was assassinated by the Yugoslav secret police UDBA, in Paris 1977, the event was mentioned as a side story - with unavoidable speculation that Busic's death may have been the result of the Croatian emigre infighting.

The travesty of the present legal International Criminal Court in the Hague is that its judges never wishes to examine the root cause of the recent crimes committed in ex-Yugoslavia. It never occurs to Hague prosecutors that there were large scale infra- and extra- judiciary historical precedents for the more recent crimes which they are supposed to impartially adjudicate.

End of Part 1.

NIKOLA STEDUL TOMISLAV SUNIC Dr Sunic is an author, former US professor in political science and a former Croat diplomat. He is the author of _Titoism and Dissidence (1995). His website is www.watermark.hu/doctorsunic/_

Mr Stedul is a former Croat emigre, who was a victim of the Yugoslav secret police assassination attempt in Scotland, October 1988. He was also a former president of the Croatian National Democratic Party in Croatia.

english.pravda.ru/news/opinion/columnists/13-02-2002/35419-0/

Ethnic Identity versus White Identity: Differences between the U.S. and Europe (Tomislav Sunic)

www.toqonline.com/current-issue/

Vol.12, No.4 (Winter 2012/13).

A clarification of terms and concepts is in order when dealing with trendy words in the social sciences. Although the idea of identity is an ancient theme, the word ‘identity’ over the last few decades has been subject to a flurry of subjective interpretations, resulting often in contradictory definitions. One hundred years ago, the word ‘identity’ was used in forensic medicine and in police files, but seldom in the sense of national, religious or racial identities. Therefore, today’s usage of the word ‘identity’ is not always appropriate given that this word can easily elicit contradictory meanings depending on who is using it and in what political environment. Thus, for instance, a citizen from the Federal Republic of Germany can carry multiple identities that may complement each other, but they may also exclude each other. He can describe himself as a “good European,” although he may be of North African or Turkish stock, and may in addition sport several other vocational identities that have nothing in common with his racial, religious or national heritage.

The question, however, is which is his primary identity and which is his secondary identity? How does he define himself and how does the Other define him? What comes first? His racial identity, his religious identity, his ethnic identity, his citizen awareness, or his professional affiliation? In his book on identity, Alain de Benoist, writes about the conflicting nature of identities, adding that “the belief that identity can be better preserved without [these] confrontations [among different identities] is nonsense. On the contrary the confrontations make identity possible.”1

In other words, a person asserts his identity best when he draws a sharp demarcation line between himself and the Other, or by violently confronting the Other. Likewise, he will best identify himself with his ingroup in so far as his ingroup differs from other out-groups.

Seen from a historical point of view, the idea of identity has always been a heated topic in the West, although this topic has been wrapped up in different words. From Homer’s Ulysses to Goethe’s Faust, White Europeans and Americans have never tired of asking questions about who they were and who they are.

Oswald Spengler deals with the idea of identity, although in his main work he never used that word, preferring instead the expression “second religiousness” and avoiding reference to the race factor. In the anomic and rootless Western societies of today, national, religious and racial identities have given way to new identities, which manifest themselves in the worshipping of exotic and esoteric “idols” and icons, which function now as transmission belts in the new identity-building process.2 Spengler adds that “to this corresponds in today’s world of Europe and America the occult and theosophical gimmicks, the American Christian Science, the mendacious salon Buddhism, the religious arts and crafts.”3 Such “second religiousness,” or one could call it, “fake substitute identities” of uprooted masses with no racial and no national consciousness, can often be encountered today in Western multicultural and multiracial societies. Such identities seem to be a cherished topic of discussion among contemporary academics.

Also, many self-designated White nationalists, or, as they are labeled by the Left, “White supremacists” in America and Europe, resort to similar substitute identities by adorning themselves with insignia and slogans going back to National Socialist Germany or to fascist Italy. The self-perception of these new White nationalists is often embedded in a caricatured reenactment of anachronistic infra-political activities that actually never took place in the Third Reich, but which are now projected into a surreal, vicarious world of their own imagination, as if the reenactment of those “Nazi” activities could miraculously resurrect the original National Socialist or Fascist state.

Talking About Race

This raises an additional problem with the right choice of words and hence with the appropriate conceptualization of the idea of identity today. It would be far easier if one could use specific terms such as “national consciousness,” instead of a rather generic expression “ethnic identity.” However, due to semantic distortions and the post-World War II political climate, the very specific German word ‘Volk’ (people?) or “national consciousness” (Volksbewusstsein__) are seldom used today in depicting someone’s identity in Germany and elsewhere in Europe. Hence the popularity of the English word ‘ethnic’ — a more generic and less ideologically colored word which has become a value-free locution in the studies of different peoples and races.

For example, at American universities there are courses in “Ethnic Studies,” in which students do not study racial traits of different peoples, or deal with diverse ethnicities in Europe, but focus primarily on the study of cultural identities of non-European peoples, while prudently avoiding the qualifiers “White” and “non- White.” Sometimes euphemisms can do wonders and can get a scholar fame and lifelong tenure.

Prior to World War II it was rare in Europe and America to use the word ‘ethnic’ in the study of various peoples of the world. Instead, politicians and academics were quite at ease, regardless of their ideological background, with the word ‘race’ and with “racial science” as a legitimate academic field. Even prior to the fateful European year of 1933, the locution “racial science” (Rassenkunde) was a common denominator in Germany and Europe in the study of different ethnicities and was often used by anthropologists, biologists and social scientists.4 Back in those days, the word ‘race’ was a value-free paradigm in anthropological and medical sciences and commonly used in the description of different peoples. Only after World War II did the word ‘race’ begin to acquire a negative connotation, whose legal ramifications gradually made it disappear from the academic and political discourse, giving way, instead, to the less value-loaded word ‘ethnic’. Today, if a White person utters the word ‘race’, or claims to have a “racial identity” when talking about his in-group, his ethnic identity, or his family affiliation, all hell breaks loose. The noun ‘race’ and the adjective ‘racial’ have acquired by now a quasi-demonic meaning and are used only when race riots occur, or when a White person insults a non-White person. Immediately, the White person will be labeled as a “racist.”

There seems to be an inconsistency in this new public and academic discourse. According to the modern academic and political vernacular there is no such thing as racial identity, but only ethnic and cultural identities. Should this reasoning be accepted at face value and if it can be backed up by empirical evidence, in that case there can be no “racists” either. According to the allegedly scientific results produced by modern academics and frequently echoed by contemporary politicians, there are no racially marked identities, as there is only one race, the “human race.” Modern academics and media people, however, cannot completely dispense with these negative words and expressions such as “White racists” because they badly need them in order to justify their own theories on the alleged non-existence of races.

America’s identity and Explicit and Implicit Whites

Kevin MacDonald introduced the concepts of “explicit and implicit identity,” with explicit or self-confessed White Americans being those who are aware of their racial background and who openly assert their racial identity.5 By contrast, implicit White Americans rarely assert their racial awareness, or probably do not even think conscientiously of it, yet they prefer to socialize with other Whites and to live among other Whites, and they are attracted to various aspects of traditionally White culture, such as classical music or country music.

As a result of the modern egalitarian dogma, fueled by different schools of thought, explicit White nationalists in America are often dubbed with derogatory labels such as “White supremacists.” The purpose of such a generic across-the-board defamatory expression is to denounce any inklings of racial awareness among Whites, including those Whites who are not the least inclined to denigrate or belittle other racial groups, but who solely wish to retain their own racial specificity and their own cultural heritage.

White people are gradually coalescing into implicit White communities that reflect their ethnocentrism but “cannot tell their name.” They are doing so because of the operation of various mechanisms that operate implicitly, below the level of conscious awareness. These White communities cannot assert explicit White identities because the explicit cultural space is deeply committed to an ideology in which any form of White identity is anathema.6

The huge subject of American or European White identity can be observed not only from the perspective of race alone. Other factors, such as culture, religion and politics must be also taken into account. How do White Europeans perceive White Americans and how do White American nationalists perceive themselves?7 European White nationalists typically perceive America’s identity through its foreign policy. Whether White American politicians perceive themselves in the same fashion as they are perceived by White European nationalists, is quite a different matter, often leading to serious misunderstandings.

In the eyes of many explicit White Europeans, American politicians, as well as large segments of the American society, are perceived as Bible zealots. Accordingly, many White scholars and activists in Europe view White Americans as subscribing to a version of ancient Hebrew thought. It is no accident that American foreign policy decision makers are often scorned by White European nationalists as Yahweh’s messengers attempting to punish moral transgressions. Recall George W. Bush’s crusade to “rid the world of evil-doers” in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack and the many references by the Bush Administration to the “Axis of Evil” in the lead up to the war in Iraq. Likewise, it is no coincidence that America has been far more sympathetic, over the last 50 years, to the state of Israel (seen as the fulfillment of Old Testament prophecy) than European states.

White nationalists in Europe are thus prone to emphasizing cultural and religious factors in the identity-building process among Americans. For example, the secessionist Southern states were once viewed as the symbol of evil by the Yankee Bible-inspired world improvers. In the eyes of many White Europeans this is seen as yet another example in which Americans have been motivated by a Bible-inspired world view of stark contrasts between good and evil.

There are many other examples. During World Wars I and II, it was the turn of Germany and the “Nazis” to become the symbol of evil. Then, during the Cold War, it was the turn of communism to become the new symbol of evil.

Given that the American political system sees itself as the embodiment of goodness, its diplomatic actions and foreign policies will rarely suffer from bouts of bad conscience, be it during the bombing of Dresden or the bombing of Baghdad. This is because, as White Europeans often observe, America’s identity is centered in the Jewish-inspired Biblical idea of political chosenness. This chosenness results in Americans behaving as if they have a moral imperative to punish all non-believers in the values Americans hold dear. Thus rulers who do not subscribe to democracy are perceived as less than human — as little more than dangerous animals. Accordingly, such dangerous animals need to be killed or at least removed from power.

Today, there are no evil Confederates, fascists, or communists in the official America’s identity-building process. Another symbol of evil in the identity-building process must be created, such as ‘Islamism’, a word which is frequently invoked by many White nationalists today.

For the time being anti-Islamism in America, like anti-fascism in modern Germany, is a risk-free intellectual endeavor. It operates as a socially acceptable substitute identity and is often encouraged by neoconservative Jewish circles. Such a negative identity serves as a nice cover for White nationalists when they need to tone down their own explicit White identity. Since it can be professionally damaging to criticize non-White immigrants in the USA, let alone openly criticize Jewish influence, many explicit White Americans prefer to hide their criticism of multiracial America behind criticism of Muslims.

Some well-known members of European nationalist parties even go a step further. For fear of being labeled “White supremacists,” or “anti-Semites” — or even worse, for fear of being called “neo-Nazis” — they resort to similar anti-Islamic rhetoric mixed with eulogies of the Jews and coupled with atonement trips to Israel.8 Such a psychological cover is viewed by many White American and European nationalists as the safest way to get a free ride at home for their anti-Muslim hectoring, or for their criticism of multiculturalism.

State and Ethnic Identity

White Americans identify themselves with America quite differently than White Europeans do with their various nations. The foundation of America was a case of rational political constructivism, whereas in Europe a strong notion of the nation (‘Volk’) preceded attempts at state building. Incidentally, there is no corresponding word in English for the German word ‘Volk’. The English word ‘people’ is ambiguous, as it can yield different meanings.

Therefore, the idea that America is “a proposition state” (or a “construct state”) has a certain surface plausibility. Moreover, a rationally constructed state, such asAmerica, in contrast to an organic state in Europe, is far more vulnerable to the ideology of multiculturalism, which in turn can prompt its architects to be more open to the influx of foreign races and other cultures.

This in part explains a weaker sense of national community among White Americans than among White Europeans. In this sense one can say that even the highly acclaimed American constitutional patriotism resembles a Spenglerian “third religion”; or more specifically, it reflects a new political theology with all the hallmarks of the bygone Enlightenment period. Even the so-called constitutional patriotism in the Federal Republic of Germany, which can be described as an acquired “civil religion,” is just a meager post-WWII imported copy of American constitutional patriotism, with one important difference: America was founded by White politicians of the Enlightenment period, whose explicit racial identity was far better formulated and more freely voiced than by European thinkers and politicians of the same epoch. Unlike White racial “identitarians” in Europe, explicit White racial awareness in America continued to hold the judiciary high ground until the mid- 20th Century.

Identifying with the state in America has little in common with the traditional “folk-culture-bound” form of identifying with the state that is so characteristic of Central and Eastern Europe. For this reason, the substitute factor of race has traditionally played among White American nationalists a stronger role in the identity-building process than among White European nationalists. However, despite differences in their historical self-image and self-perception, White Europeans and White Americans are becoming more and more aware today of the factor which binds them together and which, in a state of economic crisis or in the distinct possibility of their country’s break-up can play a crucial role: their common racial heritage.

European Identities, “Civil War Identities”

The term “European identity” is lexical nonsense. Just as there are differences in self-perceptions between White Americans vs. White Europeans with regard to their state and their racial identity respectively, there are also different and conflicting ethnic identities among the dozens of European peoples. It is questionable whether it will be ever possible to set up the common European identity of which so many Europeans like to dream. Theoretically, such “pan-European” identity would probably conform to the views and dreams of many White Americans, who are, to be sure, less plagued by their own tribal interethnic squabbles than White Europeans.

There is no European identity as such; it has never existed, other than among some theoreticians nursing the idea of a continental Euro-Asian homeland.9 It remains a mystery how hundreds of different ethnic groups stretching from the Elbe in Germany to Vladivostok in Russia, can construct a common identity. Despite living in the same general geographic location, most Europeans identify themselves first with their clan, community and ethnicity and not with their next door neighbors—whom they often violently reject. European peoples often frame their identity on what Tatu Vanhanen aptly calls “ethnic nepotism,” whereby the crucial characteristic of an ethnic group is that its members are genetically more closely related to each other than to the members of other groups.10 Such ethnic or clannish nepotism—so frequent in Europe and even within one single ethnic group—can in no way foster the idea of an all-encompassing White identity, which many White American nationalists consider as their primary goal.

In contrast to the “multicultural,” or more precisely, multiracial societies of Western Europe, peoples of Central and Eastern Europe are relatively racially homogeneous, but ethnically they are highly heterogeneous. Their present state of racial cohesiveness, albeit with always simmering interethnic chauvinism, owes much to the legacy of the bygone communist epoch. In retrospect and paradoxically, the good side of the communist legacy is that communism had never appealed to potential non-European immigrants and therefore had made the East European peoples racially more homogenous. Here, of course, the usage of the word ‘ethnic’ is appropriate, since it would be very complicated to talk about different sub-races among East and Central Europeans. Yet on the implicit level East Europeans are far more aware of their Nordic, Dinaric, Alpine, or Mediterranean phenotypes respectively. Their historical and interethnic grievances are not based on interracial hatreds, but lie exclusively in the field of culture and religion. Therefore, one must never underestimate interethnic, inter-White and inter-European resentments as a source of possible new conflicts in this region of Europe.

Clearly, from the perspective of “Whiteness” or their “European identity,” Central and Eastern Europeans are more “European” than Western Europeans. Moreover, feelings of historical guilt or self-hatred, as encountered often in Germany, Great Britain, or even in the USA today, are almost unknown among Central and East Europeans. The national pride of White citizens in Eastern Europe is relatively strong and determines to a large extent their identity.

The average citizen in Croatia or Hungary, for example, doesn’t need to read academic treatises on the failure of the multicultural system in West Europe or in the U.S. Nor does he need to immerse himself in the studies of different races in order to find out who he is. In Croatia, for instance, citizens know they are White, Croats and Catholics. And they are quite proud of it. The same applies to citizens in Poland or Hungary.

The reason for their explicit ethnic and racial identity, in comparison to citizens in Germany or in the USA, is two-fold: on the one hand, it is a logical response to the violent denial of their national identity by the preceding communist system. On the other hand, their “Whiteness” and their national identity, in view of the extremely small number of non-European residents, do not appear to them as a serious out-group threat. On the agenda of nationalist parties in Eastern Europe one comes across endless passages depicting real or perceived historical threats from their White European near neighbors, whereas the subject of non–European immigration is seldom discussed.

The interethnic resentments in Eastern Europe resulting from ethnic nepotism are very pronounced, and they often turn ugly. Thus the national identity of a Polish nationalist, who may otherwise agree on all points with his nationalist counterpart from Germany—such as their common criticism of globalism, their anticommunism and their antiliberalism — is often accompanied by strong anti- German feelings. One third of ethnic Hungarians — more than 2 million — living in Slovakia, Serbiaand Romania typically define their national identity through their resentment of the peoples among whom they live. Czech nationalists seldom like to discuss with their German counterparts the issue of the forcible deportation of 3 million ethnic Germans from Czechoslovakia after World War II. Despite some semblance of peace between Serbs and Croats, these two ethnically similar, neighboring peoples identify with two entirely different historical narratives and two completely different and mutually hostile and exclusive victimihoods. In short, Serbs and Croats, despite their remarkable ethnic and linguistic similarity, display two radically and mutually exclusive identities. For a Croatian nationalist it is difficult to become, despite his anti-liberal and anti-communist rhetoric, “a good Croat” without describing himself all too often as an “anti-Serb.”11

Interethnic hatred in Western Europe today plays a far lesser role than ever before, largely due to the constant influx of non-Europeans, who are now perceived as the main threat. The negative image of Third World immigrants has prompted many West European White nationalists to see themselves no longer as victims of the national myths of their White European neighbors, but as victims of pan-racial pandemonium brought about by the liberal capitalist system. For many White European nationalists today, this raises the question: What good is it now to define oneself as a Swede, or a German, or to dream of Greater Germany, Greater Sweden, or Greater France, considering the fact that more than 10 to 20 percent of French, Belgian, or German citizens are of non-European and non-White origin?

Negative Identities and Random Identities

The phenomenon of negative identity, which usually surfaces in a state of emergency, needs also to be mentioned. One could paraphrase Carl Schmitt and argue that a country’s degree of sovereignty is best visible in a state of emergency. At that moment even an apolitical person becomes well aware of who he is, prompting him to make a quick and sharp distinction between “the friend and the foe.”

Likewise, in times of war a White citizen in the USA or Europe can become best aware of his explicit Whiteness.12 When a major crisis looms on the horizon, each of us knows whether he is an implicit or explicit German, Croatian, or American. And he knows which racial group he belongs to and to which he needs to swear his allegiance. Should he forget his identity, it is likely that the Other from an out-group will quickly remind him who he is. For example, during frequent brawls between members of different racial groups in the German town of Neukölln (a center of Muslim immigration) or in the U.S. cities of Cleveland or South Los Angeles (home to many different non-White groups), even the most implicitly identified Whites — i.e., Whites who would otherwise not have any explicit awareness or concern about their racial background and their racial ingroup — are likely to experience sudden racial reawakening. As a result of such conflicts, the process of White identity-building takes place in an unusually rapid manner.

It should be noted that this is also the case with many White nationalists who embraced an explicit racial identity after finding that their professional career was destroyed or in danger. There are a lot of belated White nationalists in America and Europe who like to boast about how “they have experienced their nationalist and racial awakening.” In most cases these individuals were once apolitical individuals. But when their careers ran the risk of being ruined due to the multicultural system and its “positive discrimination” in favor of non-Whites, they do not hesitate to become vocal and explicit White nationalists.

Such reactive random identities were quite common among Croatian politicians in 1991 with the breakup of Yugoslavia. Many former high Communist officials began to detect their nationalist identities only after the Yugoslav Communist Army (JNA) and the Serb paramilitary units had begun their assault on secessionist Croatia. Many of those belated Croat nationalists, prior to 1991, were explicitly anti-Croatian apparatchiks; oftentimes they were virulent “Yugoslavs.” It was strange to observe in late 1991 how former communist party members converted in a twinkle of an eye into Croatian and Serbian explicit nationalists respectively. In a similar vein, one cannot exclude that with the deepening political and economic crisis in Europe and America, White German, French and American citizens will begin to vote for nationalist parties en masse.

Political opportunism can often be described as a psychological response to a state of emergency.

In terms of negative or reactive identities, one could also draw a parallel with long-standing Christian anti-Semitism, which may be also called a form of negative identity. Millions of Christians resent the Otherness of the Jews, yet at the same time they pray to the Jewish God Yahweh, or devote their lifetimes to the study of ancient Hebrew texts. Alain de Benoist cogently argues that Christian anti-Semites turned the ethnic Jewish God Yahweh into their own anti-Semitic and globalist god.13

Culture and Race: Perishable and Inherited Identities

Historically, different brands of nationalism, as transmitters of identities, have played a negative role in Europe. In this sense, White Americans, despite their weaker sense of statehood have an advantage over White Europeans. First off, they have been able to avoid destructive interethnic disputes among themselves. Traditional methods of self-identification with a specific territory, as romantic and poetic as they may have been in the past for many European nationalists, are hardly suitable for today’s global capitalist system which destroys all identities, including those of White peoples everywhere in the world. The traditional obsession of White Europeans with their state and their tribe at the expense of neighboring European tribes and states has turned out to be counterproductive. One may argue that non-European immigrants, including non-European foreign powers, have been the only true beneficiaries of these inter-White disputes. In fact, interethnic, inter-White disputes only seem to provide legitimacy to the neo-Marxist/liberal experiment with its ideology of mass immigration and multiculturalism. Such old and small-time European nationalisms, coupled with the veneration of the nation-state have become anachronistic in view of today’s changing racial picture in Europe and America.

One could also suggest that in order to preserve their true identity White Europeans and White Americans must first resurrect their common cultural and racial awareness. It is true that the word ‘race’ in modern political vernacular, as an identity-building factor, has by now acquired a quasi-criminal meaning. In the opinion of the ideologues of the left, the social environment must pave the way for the identity-building process. Here, however, American sociobiologists can be helpful in formulating the view that racial and ethnic identities are an integral aspect of human nature.

However, first and foremost the meaning of race should be re-evaluated. Race is not just a biological phenomenon: it also has spiritual implications. The metaphysical base of the race should come first, as Julius Evola argues:

The mistake by many racial fanatics, who think that the resurrection of race, within its ethnic unity signify ipso facto the rebirth of a nation, lies precisely there: they conceive of a people as of “purebred” horses, cats or dogs. The preservation or the restoration of racial purity in the narrow sense means everything in so far as an animal is concerned, but not as far as humans are concerned.14

The common racial heredity of White Americans and Europeans appears as the only valid factor in the identity-building process. It cannot be changed at will. One can change his ideology, his language, his theology, his favorite football team and his geographic location. But a person cannot change his genetic heritage. However, as Evola wrote, to consider genetic heritage or the race factor as the only hallmark of identity boils down to biological determinism and is unlikely to generate strong emotions of loyalty. This is particularly true with many White nationalists in America, who focus too often on the anthropological aspect of race — the physical phenotype — while neglecting the spiritual part of race.

The resurrection of identity among White Europeans and Americans in a broader racially spiritual way appears as the only valid answer. “Not only breeding and selection are part of race,” wrote the German pedagogue Ernst Krieck, who himself played a prominent role in higher education in National Socialist Germany, “but also the form, the style, and personal attitude and the “folkish lifestyle” — within which racial value come to the fore.”15 Furthermore, Ludwig Clauss, who also played a prominent academic and racialist role not just in National Socialist Germany, but much earlier in the liberal Weimar Germany, wrote in his little known book Rasse und Charakter:

Race is not only, as is still frequently believed in laymen circles, a lump of inherited characteristics (e.g., talents, musical skills, organizational skills, intelligence, etc.), but an inheritable law of Gestalt, which manifests itself in all traits that man can have and that bestow those traits with style. Not by the possession of those traits can one recognize the race of a man, but by the style he uses those traits.16

The overemphasis of the physical and biological features in search of racial identity is often a dead end street. Have we not met many good-looking White individuals in Europe and America who are the textbook cases of intellectual and moral depravity? The genetic heritage of Whites must be the main part of his identity only in so far it holds a racially good spiritual direction. A beautiful White body is not necessarily a reflection of a good character. Only spirit can provide a people and an individual with finite identity.

Notes

  1. Alain de Benoist, Nous et les autres (Paris: éd. Krisis, 2006), 75. ↩↩↩

  2. Oswald Spengler, Der Untergang des Abendlandes, Vol. 2 (München: DTV, 1976), 941. ↩↩↩

  3. Ibid. ↩↩↩

  4. Hans F. K. Günther, Rassenkunde Europas, (München: J. F. Lehmanns Verlag, 1929); Ilse Schwidetzky, Rassenkunde der Altslawen (Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke Verlag, 1938). ↩↩↩

  5. Kevin MacDonald, “Psychology and White Ethnocentrism,“ The Occidental Quarterly 6, no.4 (Winter, 2006-07): 7–46; Kevin MacDonald. “Effortful Control, Explicit Processing and the Regulation of Human Evolved Predispositions,” Psychological Review 115, no.4 (2008): 1012–1031. ↩↩↩

  6. MacDonald, “Psychology and White Ethnocentrism,” 22. ↩↩↩

  7. See Tomislav Sunic, Homo americanus: Child of the Postmodern Age (with a foreword by Kevin MacDonald) (Seattle, WA: BookSurge, 2007). ↩↩↩

  8. Lorenz Jäger, “Neue Freunde für Israel: Reise nach Jerusalem,“ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (December 13, 2010). ↩↩↩

  9. Alexandre Latsa , ”Moscou: capitale de l’Europe!“ In “Le retour de la troisième Rome” Eurasia Vol 3(4) (Dublin: Éditions Avatar, 2009). One of the most popular spokesmen for “Eurosianism” is Alxander Dugin, a Russian writer. See Eldar Ismailov and Vladimer Papava, Rethinking Central Eurasia (Johns Hopkins University, SAIS, 2010 ). papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2196485 ↩↩↩

  10. Tatu Vanhanen, “Ethnic conflicts explained by ethnic nepotism,” Research in Biopolitics 7 (Stamford, CT: JAI Press Inc., 2005), 13. ↩↩↩

  11. Tomislav Sunic, La Croatie ; un pays par défaut? (Paris: Dublin: Avatar, 2010). See page 56 and especially the chapter ”L’identité conflictuelle.“ ↩↩↩

  12. Carl Schmitt Politische Theologie (2nd ed.) (München und Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot 1934; first edition published in 1922), 11. ↩↩↩

  13. Alain de Benoist, Comment peut- on être païen? (Paris: A. Michel, 1981), 161–178, passim. ↩↩↩

  14. Julius Evola, Heidnischer Imperialismus (German translation by Friedrich Bauer) (Leipzig: Armanen Verlag, 1933), 52–53. ↩↩↩

  15. Ernst Krieck, National-politische Erziehung (Leipzig: Armanen Verlag, 1936), 26. ↩↩↩

  16. Ludwig F. Clauss, Rasse und Charakter (Frankfurt: Verlag Moritz Diesterweg, 1942), 80. ↩↩↩

The Jerusalem Post, Tom Sunic

Published Oct. 15, 2009.

Sir, – Whenever an article appears in the foreign media dealing with the role ofCroatiaduring WWII, the reader must expect a deluge of unsubstantiated body counts. For their part, to prove their anti-fascist atonement, Croats worldwide must resort to apologetic disclaimers and self-accusatory mea culpas. Your writer might as well have gone a step further and declared that present-dayCroatiais a Xerox copy of the former fascist WWII Croatia – since, after all, this newly reborn state uses more or less the same insignia while officially rejecting the number of 700,000 victims allegedly killed by Croat fascists.

What in fact are the empirical sources that the author mines when he states that WWII Croatia was “the most murderous of the Axis-aligned countries?” Instead he discusses the marginal Croatian NGO, the Croatian Cultural Movement (HUP) and its desire to erect a monument to Ante Pavelic.

Is your writer fluent in Croatian and German? Has he ever visited the German Federal Archives in Koblenz in order to give free rein to Efraim Zuroff’s admonition “to any person with any sense of moral integrity” regarding the crimes committed by Ustashi Croats? The whole piece smacks of the old-style Yugoslav communist “normative agitprop locution,” or the Soviet-styled “double talk” – which a B-student would have a hard time swallowing.

Croatian history – and, for that matter, European history as a whole – is not black and white. Your writer could have mentioned that the head of WWII Croatia, Ante Pavelic, had a number of Muslim ministers in his government, and that a number of Croats of Jewish extraction served as high ranking officers in Ustashi military units.

Last but not least, he might have mentioned large-scale genocides, in the months after WWII, of hundreds of thousands of Croatian and German civilians by the Yugoslav communist strongmen Josip Broz Tito, whose handful of surviving butchers, although senile, are still vocal inCroatia. As usual their killing fields are consigned to historical oblivion.

Instead of wasting time on the trivial portraiture of would-be Pavelic fans, serious research should be done on communist crimes of the former Western darling, the ex-communistYugoslavia.

TOMISLAV (TOM) SUNIC
Zagreb, Croatia